اطلاعات نامتقارن بین گروهی در بازار بیمه درمان تکمیلی گروهی

Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P. A., & Pinquet, J. (2003). Moral hazard and dynamic insurance data. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 767-820.

Chiappori, P. A., & Salanié, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets. Journal of political Economy, 108(1), 56-78.

Cohen, A. (2005). Asymmetric information and learning: Evidence from the automobile insurance market. Review of Economics and statistics, 87(2), 197-207.

Cohen, A. (2012). Asymmetric Learning in Repeated contracting: An empirical study. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), 419-432.

Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010). Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets. Journal of Risk and insurance, 77(1), 39-84.

Dionne, G., Michaud, P. C., & Dahchour, M. (2013). Separating moral hazard from adverse selection and learning in automobile insurance: longitudinal evidence from France. Journal of the European Economic Association,11(4), 897-917.

Duarte, F. (2012). Price elasticity of expenditure across health care services. Journal of health economics, 31(6), 824-841.

Eling, M., Jia, R., & Yao, Y. (2015). Between‐group adverse selection: evidence from group critical illness insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance.

Ellis, R. P., Martins, B., & Zhu, W. (2016). Health Care Demand Elasticities by Type of Service.

Hanson, R. (2005). Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters. Economics of Governance, 6(2), 139-157.

Mayers, D., & Smith Jr, C. W. (1981). Contractual provisions, organizational structure, and conflict control in insurance markets. Journal of Business, 407-434.

Monheit, A. C., & Schone, B. S. (2004). How has small group market reform affected employee health insurance coverage?. Journal of Public Economics, 88(1-2), 237-254.