گذر از سیاق بیناشخصی دلیل به درونی‌گرایی: نکاتی انتقادی

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[10] Schroeder, Mark, (2007). Slaves of the Passions, Oxford University Press.

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[15] Sobel, David, (2016). From Valuing to Value: Towards a Defense of Subjectivism, Oxford University Press.

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[17] Williams, Bernard, (1995). "Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame", In Making sense of humanity, Cambridge University Press, pp. 35–45.