پیوندهای مفید
اخبار و اعلانات
آمار
| تعداد نشریات | 158 |
| تعداد شماره‌ها | 6,225 |
| تعداد مقالات | 67,685 |
| تعداد مشاهده مقاله | 114,953,293 |
| تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله | 89,626,034 |
تأثیر گفتمان‌های هویتی روسیه بر نقش‌یابی اوراسیایی ایران | ||
| مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی | ||
| مقاله 7، دوره 12، شماره 1، فروردین 1398، صفحه 95-113 اصل مقاله (533.25 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/jcep.2019.268580.449806 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| بهاره سازمند* 1؛ حسین صوراناری2 | ||
| 1دانشیار مطالعات منطقه‌ای، دانشگاه تهران | ||
| 2دکتری مطالعات منطقه‌ای، دانشگاه تهران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| گفتمان‌های هویتی روسیه (غربگرایی، دولتگرایی و اوراسیاگرایی) در دوران پساشوروی با تولید نظام‌های معنایی، شیوۀ تفسیر مادی و انگاره‌ای نظام سیاسی این کشور از اوراسیا و منطقه‌گرایی اوراسیایی را تعیین کردهاند. این موضوع، فراتر از روند سازواری بیپایان رفتار منطقه‌ای روسیه با نظام‌های معنایی و گزارههای هویتی متفاوت، بازبینی و بازچینش مستمر فهرست دوستان/ دشمنان این کشور به‌ویژه در منطقۀ اوراسیا را در پی داشته است. به‌دلیل همسایگی مشترک ایران و روسیه با منطقۀ اوراسیا، مفهوم‌سازی‌های هویتی روسیه از ایران، بیش از همه، از چگونگی تولید و پردازش مادی- معنایی گفتمان‌های هویتی این کشور از منطقۀ اوراسیا تأثیر پذیرفته است. از جمله، تحتتأثیر تحول هویت‌پایۀ نگرش روسیه به اوراسیا و منطقه‌گرایی در آن، نقش‌های مفروض برای ایران در سیاست اوراسیایی روسیه و در نتیجه ترجیح‌دادن/ ندادن همکاری با آن در حوزه‌های موضوعی مختلف بارها دچار دگردیسی شده است. با وجود تفاوت در اندیشهورزی هویتی و عمل سیاسی، قاعدۀ رفتاری ابزارگرایانه با ایران، تولید مشترک گفتمان‌های هویتی روسیه بوده است. این قاعدۀ رفتاری، نتیجۀ یادگیری اجتماعی از فرایندهای تعاملی میان تعریفهای هویتی پیشینی و تجربههای هویتی پسینی بوده و امکان روندسازی و نهادینگی را از عملکرد اوراسیایی ایران گرفته است. از اینرو، مشارکت ایران در منطقهگراییهای موجود اوراسیایی دستاورد اندکی داشته و ابتکار طرحهای منطقهگرایانۀ جدید اوراسیایی از سوی این کشور نیز موفقیتی در پی نداشته است. نوشتار پیشرو، با هدف فهم «نقش گفتمان‌های هویتی روسیه در نقش‌یابی اوراسیایی ایران»، به‌دنبال راستیآزمایی انگارۀ مبتنی بر «نقش بازدارندگی این گفتمانها بر نقش‌یابی اوراسیایی ایران»است. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| اوراسیاگرایی؛ ایران؛ دولتگرایی؛ روسیه؛ غربگرایی؛ گفتمان‌های هویتی؛ منطقه‌گرایی اوراسیایی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| The Influence of Russian Identity Discourses in Finding Iran’s Eurasian Role | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Bahareh Sazmand1؛ Hossein Suranari2 | ||
| 1Associate Professor of Regional Studies, University of Tehran | ||
| 2PhD in Regional Studies, University of Tehran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The attitude and approach of Russia's encounter with Eurasian region has gone a long way in the post-Sovietera. The identity discourses of Russia including Westernism, Statism and Eurasianism in the post-Soviet era have determined the interpretation of Russian political system regarding Eurasia and Eurasian regionalism based on formation of a spiritual system. This topic beyond the endless process of adaptability of Russia’s regional behavior with different spiritual systems and identity statements has led to a continuous review and re-listing of its rivals, colleagues and allies, especially in Eurasia. For example, due to the evolution of Russia’s identical attitude towards Eurasia and regionalism approach, Iran’s place in this category and the preference / not to cooperate with it has been repeatedly changed. Despite the differences in form, the instrumentalist rule of conduct with Iran has been the joint production of Russian identity discourses. This behavioral rule has been the result of a social learning of interactive process between prior identities and latent identity experiences. The following article is aimed at understanding the “role of Russian identity discourses in the Eurasian role of Iran”, which seeks to verify the notion based on “the role of deterrence of these discourses on findings to verify Iran’s Eurasian role”. Because of the proximity of the two countries with Eurasia, the conceptualizations of Russia’s identity from Iran have been most influenced by the materialist-semantic process of the country’s identity discourses. In other words, under the influence of this subject, some assumed roles have been defined for Iran such as the “South Threat”, “Playing Card with the West”, “a natural partner and ally against the common enemy”, “a reliable and credible ally in the region and the world”. In Russia’s Eurasian politics, the construction has left behind an endless rupture. As a result, the lack of interests in relation to Iran and the preference / unwillingness of cooperation with it have been repeatedly transformed into different topics of debate. Specifically in Eurasian region all three discourses with differences in identity and political thoughts have preferred to adopt an instrumentalist approach to Iran. This article tries to examine what has gone through the implementation of a critical constructivist approach, which focuses on the process of transforming the attitude of Russia’s dual identity discourse into Iran-Eurasia. The main goal is to answer this question: “What role did Russia’s identity discourses have during the post-Soviet era in Iran’s function in Eurasia?” In response, the hypothesis will be tested that “Russia’s identity discourses have played a deterrent role in the Eurasian role of Iran”, will be tested. In this regard, the three dialectics of Westernism, Statism and Eurasianism (conservative and critical) in relation to Iran were studied. In terms of Westernism toward cooperation with Iran, there is a discrepancy between a priori and a posteriori identity. In fact, the late Western experience of Iran (such as the experience of Iran’s constructive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan crises and its non- intervention approach in the Chechnya crisis) has changed the cynical meanings of Iran (such as the Islamic / South threat) and has created the ground to cooperate with it. Regarding the state-oriented nature and the critical nature of Eurasianism, the proactive identity of Iran in relation to it confirms its pre-emptive identity. The two despite sharing somewhat discriminating meanings with the anti-Western identity in Iran, favored a “flexible, temporary, and instrumental” cooperation with Iran on the sustained and inseparable co-operation with the “power policy”. Here one can also speak of the effect of latent experiences, but these experiences appear to have a stabilizing role, not a changeable one in the anti-Semitism of the discourses between Statism and critical Eurasianism. However, the conservative Eurasian type supports unity with Iran. But, as noted, this alliance is only against the common “western” threat in Eurasian region; it has been dealing with creation of the identity structures of “Eurasian civilization” and “the Russian world”. The inappropriateness of a priori and posterior identity look at Iran in the discourse of Westernism and the appropriateness of this in the two discourses of statism and Eurasianism were derived from the social learning of interactive processes simultaneously with the triples of the West-Eurasia-Iran. Russia’s laws and rules of conduct have been developed with Iran. The result, in particular, in the Eurasian region has been the creation of an instrumentalist rule of law with Iran among all Russian identity discourses. This code of conduct has deprived the possibility of a process of institutionalization of the Eurasian function of Iran. It seems that the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of its anti-Western / anti-American identity and its institutional isolation, has accepted the politics of inhibiting production structures in Russian identity discourses on its Eurasian dedication and against the acquisition of Russia’s support and cooperation in the international arena and its foreign policy priorities namely, the Middle East favored the “insignificance” of the “active role” in the Eurasian region. At the same time, it is not possible to speak of Eurasia’s “complete passivity” and “stagnation” toward Iran. Iran has acted as an intermediary in ending some of the region’s conflicts and has resisted the Caspian Sea littoral states demands in reaching its proportional share. But the point is that, in contrast to other regional and global actors (China, Turkey, the United States and the European Union) which have been able to expand their sphere of influence and interests in “unnecessary conditions of Russia” Iran has succeeded in advancing some of its innovative regionalization policies but has not found regional capability in the “Need for Russia’s conditions”. As a result, Iran’s participation in the existing Eurasian regionalism has had little achievement and the new regionalism initiative of the country, such as the formation of the organization of the Caspian Sea littoral states, the convergence of Persian-speaking countries, and the plan to establish “Nowruz International Foundation” have not been successful. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Eurasian Regionalism, Eurasianism, Identity Discourses, Iran, Russia, Statism, Westernism | ||
| مراجع | ||
|
A) English
1. Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel (2007), “Constructivism and Identity Formation: an Interactive Approach”, Uluslararasi Hukukve Politika, Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 121-144.
2. Campbell, David (1998), Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
3. Freedman, Robert (2006) (a), Putin and Iran: a Changing Relationship, Johns Hopkins University: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.
4. Freedman, Robert (2006) (b), “Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record”, The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Available at: http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, (Accessed on: 8/4/2018).
5. Hopf, Ted (1998), “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 171-200.
6. Hopf, Ted (2005), “Identity, Legitimacy and the Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. S1, pp. 225-243.
7. Hopf, Ted (2007), “Russia’s Identity Relations with Europe, the EU, and the United States: 1991-2007”, Available at: https://www.norface.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/s1-hopf.pdf, (Accessed on: 8/4/2018).
8. Katz, Mark N. (2002), “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Putin Era”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 69-81.
9. Koolaee, Elaheh (2008), “Iran and Russia”, Conference on Russia and Islam-Edinburg, Available at: www.pol.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file /0004/28687/Iran_and_Russia.pdf, (Accessed on: 23/3/2018).
10. Kozhanov, Nikolay (2012), “Russia’s Relations with Iran: Dialogue without Commitments”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus, No.120, Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ pubs/PolicyFocus120.pdf, (Accessed on: 23/8/2018).
11. Kozhanov, Nikolay (2015), Understanding the Revitalization of Russian-Iranian Relations, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
12. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso.
13. Light, Margot (2004), “In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology”, in: Rick Fawn (ed.), Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies, London: Frank Cass, pp. 41-57.
14. Lo, Bobo (2002), Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
15. Nassibli, Nasib (1999), “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: Past and Present”, Journal of Azerbaijan Studies, Available at: http://dspace .khazar.org/jspui/ bitstream/ 12345 6789/172/3/ N%20Nasibli .pdf, (Accessed on: 15/12/2017).
16. Naumkin, Vitaly (1998), “The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospects for the Future”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-9.
17. Russelle, Dybvik (1992), “US, Russia Differ on Sale of Subs to Iran”, Available at: https://www.fas.org/news/iran/1992/920924-244378.htm, (Accessed on: 28/1/2018).
18. Selezneva, Ludmilla (2003), “Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism”, in: Rick Fawn (ed.), Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, London, Frank Cass, pp.10-28.
19. Shlapentokh, Dimitry (2009), Russian Elite Image of Iran: from the Late Soviet Era to the Present, The U.S Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).
20. Trenin, Dimitry (2001), The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
21. Tsygankov, Andrei (1998), “Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia’s Contending Geopolitical Perspectives”, East European Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 304- 327.
22. Tsygankov, Andrei (2003), “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No. 36, pp. 101-127.
23. Wendt, Alexander (1994), “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, The American Political Science Association, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 384-396.
24. Wendt, Alexander (2000), “On the Via Media: a Response to the Critics”, Review of International Studies, No. 26, pp. 165-80.
25. Young Chul, Cho (2009), “Conventional and Critical Constructivist Approaches to National Security: an Analytical Survey”, The Korean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 75-102.
B) Persian
1. Azghandi, Alireza (2004), Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran: Ghoomes.
2. Azghandi, Alireza (2011), Frameworks and Orientations of Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran: Ghoomes.
3. Haji Yousefi, Amir Mohammad (2006), Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Context of Regional Development (1991-2001), Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS).
4. Karami, Jahangir (2011), “Iran and Russia: Eastern Ally or South Threat?”, International Journal of Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 171-199.
5. Koolaee, Elaheh (2006), New Great Game in Central Asia: Backgrounds and Perspectives, Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS).
6. Koolaee, Elaheh (2009), “Iran-Russia Relations: Continuity or Change?”, The Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies, Available at: http://www.iras.ir/fa/doc/ article/1145/, (Accessed on:17/4/2018).
7. Koolaee, Elaheh (2010), “Islamic Republic of Iran and South Caucasus Geopolitics”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 75-111.
8. Koolaee, Elaheh (2013), Politics and Government in Central Eurasia, Tehran: Samt.
9. Koolaee, Elaheh and Farzad Kalbali (2018), The Pattern of Russian Modernity and Identical Challenges, Tehran: Khorsandi.
10. Lukyanov, Fyodor (2016), “Specialist Meeting on the Topic: Eurasian Re-defining of New World Order”, Available at: http://www.iras.ir/fa/ doc/report/1191/, (Accessed on: 23/4/2018).
11. Moshirzadeh, Homeira (2004), “Dialogue of Civilizations in Terms of Constructivism”, Journal of Faculty of Low and Political Science, No. 63, pp. 169- 201.
12. Moshirzadeh, Homeira (2006), The Evolution of the Theory of International Relations, Tehran: Samt.
13. Shad, Mohammad (2016), “The Identical Origin of Tension in Russian-American Relations and its Impact on the Interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 14, pp. 121-156.
14. The Office of the Supreme Leader (2015), “Visit of the Russian President to the Supreme Leader of the Revolution”, Nov. 11, Available at: http://www.leader.ir/fa/content/13881/, (Accessed on: 25/3/2018). | ||
|
آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 641 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 371 |
||