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Asadi, Elnaz, Keramatzadeh, Ali, Eshraghi, Farshid. (1403). The Allocation of Groundwater Resources and Managing Conflict between Stakeholders: Evidence from Iran. , 29(1), 360-387. doi: 10.22059/ier.2025.348605.1007538
Elnaz Asadi; Ali Keramatzadeh; Farshid Eshraghi. "The Allocation of Groundwater Resources and Managing Conflict between Stakeholders: Evidence from Iran". , 29, 1, 1403, 360-387. doi: 10.22059/ier.2025.348605.1007538
Asadi, Elnaz, Keramatzadeh, Ali, Eshraghi, Farshid. (1403). 'The Allocation of Groundwater Resources and Managing Conflict between Stakeholders: Evidence from Iran', , 29(1), pp. 360-387. doi: 10.22059/ier.2025.348605.1007538
Asadi, Elnaz, Keramatzadeh, Ali, Eshraghi, Farshid. The Allocation of Groundwater Resources and Managing Conflict between Stakeholders: Evidence from Iran. , 1403; 29(1): 360-387. doi: 10.22059/ier.2025.348605.1007538

The Allocation of Groundwater Resources and Managing Conflict between Stakeholders: Evidence from Iran

Iranian Economic Review
دوره 29، شماره 1، خرداد 2025، صفحه 360-387    اصل مقاله (802.41 K)
نوع مقاله: Research Paper
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/ier.2025.348605.1007538
نویسندگان
Elnaz Asadi؛ Ali Keramatzadeh* ؛ Farshid Eshraghi
Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agricultural Management, Gorgan University of Agricultural Science and Natural Resources, Gorgan, Iran.
چکیده
Scarce water resources often involve decision-makers with conflicting interests. Effective management requires balancing objectives and strategies of multiple stakeholders. The present study analyzes the potential compromise solutions between stakeholders, using a combination of game theory and a positive mathematical programming (PMP) model. The two key players are the government, which minimizes environmental impacts such as groundwater withdrawal, and local farmers, who maximize economic profit. We employ four conflict resolution methods to calculate the players’ payoffs. The results show that creating a transactional relationship between the stakeholders reduces groundwater extraction by 36% and 37%, while the farmers' net income only drops by 8% and 9%, respectively, compared to the baseline scenario.
کلیدواژه‌ها
Conflict Resolution؛ Game Theory؛ Groundwater Resources؛ Multi-Objective Optimization؛ Positive Mathematical Programming
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