

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

Mohammad kaffash,^{*1} mostafa malakoutian²

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2023.5.16.3.5

PhD Student , Department of Islamic Revolution Studies, University of Islamic Sciences, Qom, IRAN.

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 21 August 2022 - Accepted: 27 October 2023)

Abstract

The United States government, in line with its overall policies, has consistently utilized power strategies to dominate strategic regions. This includes interventions and involvement in the wars in Iraq and Iran. In this regard, the American intelligence agency has had a specific mechanism aligned with the government's policies. The systematic evaluation and understanding of this mechanism, given the ongoing confrontation between the US and Iran, is of considerable importance. This descriptive research aims to answer the question of 'What mechanism the Central Intelligence Agency of America has employed to achieve the US government's policies regarding the imposed war?' The research hypothesis suggests that this intelligence agency, acting in accordance with the theory of "Information Dependence on Policy," has taken steps in various stages of the imposed war to pursue American political and geopolitical interests. The results show that the containment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the preservation of hegemony, and the continuation of control over the resources and interests of the West Asian region have led the Central Intelligence Agency of America to engage in cognitive and operational dimensions. This has resulted in specific outcomes, including facilitating and instigating a war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as providing executive actions that encompasses supportive, informational, and arms-related initiatives.

Keywords: CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), Imposed War, Saddam Hussein, America, Iran, Iraq.

*. Corresponding Author: afshen45@gmail.com

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

Introduction

The Middle East and the Persian Gulf are among the sensitive and focal points in the world that have experienced various transformations in the past century or so, giving rise to different political, social, and economic events. The Iraq-Iran War is one of the transformations in that region that has shaped the course of history and witnessed significant interventions by global powers, including the United States. Given the importance of intelligence in the decision-making and operations of the US government, the main focus of this research is to examine the nature of the involvement of the US intelligence agency in this war. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has always played a crucial role in implementing and executing US policies, utilizing various mechanisms to achieve these objectives. Exploring, analyzing, and formulating this role contributes to the development of information sciences and a systematic understanding of the theories, political, and security measures of the United States. The closest precedent in terms of methodology for this research can be considered the article "Examining the Executive Role of the CIA in the US Foreign Policy with an Emphasis on the Iraq Crisis" (Ghanbari, 1396) by Saeed Ghanbari and Fereydun Akbarzadeh.

The present paper aims to examine the executive role of the CIA in the US war against Iraq, evaluating the strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions of the organization. In terms of subject matter and scope, this work differs from the current research, but it shares similarities in terms of methodology and research direction. The primary focus of the upcoming research is to elucidate the cognitive and operational function of the CIA in confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran during the eight-year war, which has not been specifically addressed in previous writings. The present study adopts an analytical approach and library research method, utilizing books, articles, and domestic and international websites for data extraction. It examines the information intervention process of the CIA in the imposed war under two cognitive and operational sections and presents a balanced formulation of both directives in the concluding discussion.


1.Theoretical Approach

The process of formulating foreign policies and international actions of governments around the world is influenced by various factors and variables. Apart from certain variables rooted in the culture, norms, and ideals of each country, other influential factors in shaping foreign policy are more or less similar across all countries. One of the influential factors in this process is the intelligence agencies of each country (Mir Mohammadi, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 199). Intelligence and espionage

organizations are among the most crucial institutions involved in the foreign policy process and engagement with third countries. These organizations and the individuals at their helm play a significant role in the decision-making process. The significance of these institutions lies in their possession of information and access to centers of power. Essentially, these organizations are supposed to provide various information and analyses on foreign relations and international politics to heads of diplomacy so that they can utilize this information for policy-making and the implementation of foreign policy, taking into account the circumstances and requirements (Ghavam, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 221-238). "The theory of information dependence on policy" is one of the coherent and well-known theories regarding intelligence affairs, framing the relationship between information, intelligence organizations, and the foreign policy of governments. According to this theory, information is a part of the political system and administrative organization of the government. Therefore, its functions and missions are fully in the service of the government and the ruling political system. Information, in its broadest sense, is a variable dependent on the government. Policy organizes, directs, and, if necessary, modifies information. Sherman Kent states, "Information is not the goal setter, policy maker and designer, but it serves the functions of policy" (Shukman, 2000 AD: 95-179). On the other hand, the amount of information needs of policymakers in different countries will be proportional to their level of international involvement. Hence, an isolationist foreign policy requires less news and information, while an interventionist foreign policy requires more information. Therefore, the missions and roles of intelligence organizations are directly influenced by the foreign policy of each country, and the type of foreign policy determines the effective roles and missions of intelligence organizations. Foreign policy is an independent variable that determines, defines, and predicts information needs. Accordingly, by understanding the foreign policy and security strategies of each country, one can reassess the information needs and, in other words, the agenda and missions of its intelligence organization.

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

Figure one: Policy and information cycle



Foreign policy-making is divided into two main stages: policy formulation and implementation. In fact, one of the criteria for the effectiveness of intelligence organizations, as the cognitive arm of the modern state, is their influence in various stages of policy-making. Examining the different stages of policy-making, from issue identification to implementation, shows that policymakers' first need in all stages is the need to know and be aware of the problems and issues, the decision-making environment, the various options available to address the problem, the potential desirable and undesirable consequences of options, and the knowledge of the impact of implementing decisions on the surrounding environment and the real consequences that result from it.


This point demonstrates that the primary and essential role of intelligence organizations in policy-making, at least theoretically, is cognitive support and meeting the informational needs of the policy-making process. Intelligence organizations provide information and cognitive support for policy-making through functions such as collecting and analyzing information and delivering informational products to policymakers (Holt, 1995 AD: 10). The term policy formulation refers to the stages of issue identification, option identification, and selecting one of the options. The stage of

implementation and reviewing feedback is part of the implementation phase of the policy-making process.

Policy formulation is the decision-making process of ‘What needs to be done?’ and implementation is the practical implementation of that decision in the real world. Intelligence organizations, except in cases where they engage in covert actions, only have a role in policy formulation. As evident, policy-making in the two stages before the decision and the stage after implementation requires cognitive support. In addition to cognitive needs, effective policy-making also requires the capability to operationalize the decisions taken. This need is usually addressed by conventional executive bodies through the operationalization of the decisions. However, if the conventional executive bodies, for any reason, are unable to carry out their operational tasks, the intelligence organization, regarding its specialized capabilities in foreign and external matters, can take responsibility for the execution of specific policies if desired by policymakers. The Central Intelligence Agency of America, since its formation, has carried out various executive roles in addition to its cognitive and monitoring role, known as covert operations and clandestine operations, in accordance with the will of the policymakers, achieving some failures and successes in others. This organization, in addition to influencing the political and economic conditions of foreign countries, has also had an impact on military conditions and has carried out operations. The gradual embedding of 40 spies in Ghana by the American spy organization, led by Kwame Nkrumah, in order to disrupt the work of the government of that country, identified his opponents and distributed large sums of money among them at a crucial moment (Bulom, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 482), the overthrow of Mosaddegh's government in 1953 or Jacob Arbenz in 1954 (Kinser, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 189-249) are examples of the executive role of intelligence agencies in operationalizing the foreign policy of a country compared to other actors. The American intelligence organization, with its interventionist approach to the government of this country, has been increasingly active in both cognitive and executive dimensions, and the hypothesis of this research is in line with this theory of the cognitive and executive emergence theory of the CIA in the Iran-Iraq War.

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

Figure two: The function of the intelligence organization



2. Cognitive Support

Information support involves obtaining news through covert means, evaluation processes, combining and transforming news, and leads to estimating and activities of information services such as covert intervention in the affairs of other countries. Information is often defined as the profession of collecting foreign secrets through covert tools (Warner, 2002 AD: 22). Its task is to provide policy cognition, which will be the precursor to decision-making and actions of policymakers (Central Intelligence Agency: 1999, VII). What led to America's entry into the war against Iran in Iraq was the result of the intelligence operations of the American intelligence organization in the past periods of Middle Eastern history. With its knowledge and penetration in Iraq on one side, and its previous influence on Iran during the Pahlavi era, America provided the groundwork for decision-making and management of the West Asia region after the Islamic Revolution by encouraging and entering the imposed war, aligned with its own interests.

2.1. Historical Connection, Prerequisite of Recognition

By analyzing the history of developments in Iraq, it is clear that the cognitive mechanism used by the CIA in employing Saddam Hussein and controlling Iraq has also been taken into account in the United States'

decision to enter the war against Iran. The situation in Iraq after the overthrow of the king of this country by Abdul Karim Qasim's coup took on a different form and drew the attention of major global powers to this country. The US government saw Abdul Karim Qasim's performance as leaning towards the Soviet Union, and this matter was strengthened when Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact¹ and signed an arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the CIA planned an assassination plot against Abdul Karim Qasim to prevent Soviet infiltration in Iraq and the region, and Saddam Hussein was included among the implementers of the plan. Richard C. Sale, a United Press correspondent, writes in a report: "The first record of Saddam's contact with American authorities dates back to 1959 (1338). At that time, Saddam was a member of a six-member squad commissioned by the CIA to assassinate Abdul Karim Qasim, the Prime Minister of Iraq. At that time, the United States saw Abdul Karim Qasim's government in Iraq as promoting Soviet positions in the Middle East." (Mohammad Abdul Khaliq Kazem, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 238)

After the unsuccessful assassination of Abdul Karim Qasim on October 7, 1959, Saddam, who was suspected of involvement, fled to Lebanon. The CIA provided him with an apartment unit in Beirut and arranged a training program for him before he was sent to Egypt. Saddam had dealings with the US embassy in Cairo and interacted with individuals such as Miles Copeland, a CIA agent, and James H. Burgoyne, the chief of the CIA station in Egypt (ibid., 240). According to Reuter's news agency, during this period, Saddam Hussein lived in Cairo using the funds he received from the CIA (Mohsen Rajai, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 2). Also, according to Mustafa Tlass, the former chief of staff of the Syrian army, Saddam worked with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Tlass and Saddam studied together at Cairo University, and Tlass claims, "When Arab students were living in poverty; Saddam became employed by the CIA and benefited from vast financial resources, eating expensive meals in luxury hotels." (Safaeddin Tabaraniyan, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 60)

It is also confirmed and emphasized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the former president of Egypt, that Saddam had connections with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States between the years 1960 and 1963 (Khaled Hussein Naghib, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 3/43). While maintaining the relations between the United States and Saddam Hussein, General Abd al-Salam Arif, with the cooperation of the CIA, overthrew Abdul Karim Qasim and the Ba'ath Party, of which Saddam had been a member for

1 . Cento

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

years, came to power. Egyptian journalist Mohammad Hassanein Heikal says, quoting King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan, about this matter:

"I definitely and firmly know that what happened on February 8, 1963 in Iraq (the coup d'état led by Abdel Salam Aref and the Ba'athists led by al-Bakr) was with the support of the CIA and before the coup, various secret meetings were held between Baath Party leaders and CIA officials." (Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, *Vithaq al-Qahirah*: 140).

In 1975 (1354), it was revealed in investigations by the U.S. Senate that the CIA's Directorate of Operations had multiple plans to assassinate Abdul Karim Qasim (Abdullah Shahbazi, 2014 AD/1393 SH:566).

Thus, in parallel with maintaining Saddam's communication line with the CIA (Mohammad Abdul Khaliq Kazem, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 240), the trend inclined towards America, along with the soft and gradual collaboration of the CIA with the Ba'ath Party, began the governance in Iraq. Since Saddam Hussein had more value for Americans compared to Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, they directed the situation towards encouraging Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to support the Akrad in Iraq against the central government directed the space under the leadership of Hassan al-Bakr in a direction that Saddam Hussein, who did not hold the position of the President of Iraq in 1975, sign the Algiers Agreement instead of Hassan al-Bakr and be introduced as the savior of the Iraqi army in ending the war with the Akrad (Shahbazi, 2014 AD/1393 SH:1/556-557).

These events increased Saddam's power and paved the way for his presidency in the following years. The cumulative evidence mentioned regarding Saddam Hussein and the American spy agency indicates a deep connection between the CIA and him, designed to provide awareness and understanding of events and execution in critical situations. The CIA has maintained its communication line by identifying and employing individuals in various countries in the West Asia region and supported the government of this country in making decisions towards strengthening hegemony and American interests. This also included utilizing intelligence operations during the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution and regime change in Iran.

2.2. Military Power Assessment

The United States of America, through the CIA, was gathering information about the military status of the Islamic Republic before the war in order to advance its own interests. To achieve this goal, the American spy agency used some military personnel in Iran, especially the royalists, as agents to obtain information about the situation of Iran's forces. One of them was Brigadier General Hamid Shirazi, who was associated with Americans during a trip to Hong Kong and provided services to the American intelligence center in obtaining information. He

anticipated that he could hold an important position in the Islamic Republic's Air Force and obtained the attention and training from the American intelligence center for himself. The CIA wanted information from him about the status of fighter jets, Iran's new defense plan, and the spirit of the pilots (Students Following the Line of the Imam, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 1), which indicated the importance of assessing Iran's capabilities for the United States. These espionage connections informed America of Iran's military weakness and guided Washington's decision-making in the political situation of Western Asia by completing its knowledge base.

2.3. Decision-making in the Middle East based on Information

The United States encouraged Saddam Hussein's decision regarding the war against Iran, especially through its communication line in the Middle East and with the Ba'ath Party of Iraq. Washington was interested in the occurrence of a war in the Middle East to control the situation in this region, and saw the groundwork for this event as favorable. By acquiring information, they predicted the war and thereby also aimed to control the Islamic revolution in Iran. In a "Highly Confidential" document found among the espionage documents, the following prediction is stated:

"There is a weak possibility of an attack on Iran by a foreign power. However, continuous instability creates an environment that tempts such action. Afghanistan still faces difficulties in its own revolution. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are militarily very weak to have such ambitious goals. The Soviet Union, considering its role as a major power, is unlikely to take any further action except for supporting a Marxist government in Iran. Iraq remains the biggest threat to Iran, unless we consider global conflicts. An attack by Iraq would likely be limited to oil-rich regions as a target. The decision to carry out such an attack requires a weakened army in Iran and a valid pretext." (Students Following the Line of the Imam, (n.d.): 415)

The United States' interest in war against Iran intensified when its embassy was seized by Iranian students on Aban 13, 1358, and American employees were taken hostage. America saw an attack by a third country on Iran as one of the ways to resolve the crisis and free its employees (Kamran Ghazanfari, 4:21), and it predicted that with the collapse of the Iranian government, a pro-Western government would take control (Mohammad Dorudiyani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 23).

According to Radio America's report on 14/03/1366, one of the reasons for Iraq's attack on Iran was covert intervention by the United States. "James E. Kinnane," former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said at the Islamic Communities Conference held at Villanova University in Pennsylvania about this:

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

"In 1980 (1358-1359), the CIA conducted an intelligence investigation into the Iranian government's disintegration and the collapse of the Iranian society and armed forces after the revolution, and a version of that report was given to Saudi Arabia, and apparently they handed it over to Iraq." (Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency, 1987 AD/1366 SH:1)

According to the article in Jun Afarinak magazine, one month before the start of the war, Saudi Arabia's leaders gave Saddam a valuable gift when welcoming him, and that gift was the aforementioned report that the CIA had provided him with detailed information about the situation of the Iranian army, its number of personnel, positions, usable equipment, and other confidential information (Hossein Ardestani, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 83).

This report is considered a factor in Saddam's provocation in attacking Iran and lays the groundwork for an attack on Iran, gradually shaping the atmosphere of support from other US espionage agencies for Saddam and the Baath regime. The theory of America's support for Saddam Hussein at the beginning of the war is emphasized in some circles and political newspapers. Among them, the Al-Zakhaf Al-Akhzar weekly wrote in Tir 1360: "Saddam Qadisiyah has great skills in fulfilling roles. Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, is a tool of the CIA. Since the coup of 1968, he has fulfilled the desires of imperialist circles, especially the CIA... The role assigned to Saddam is a result of America's enmity and hostility towards the Iranian revolution." (Saeed Purdarab, 7:569)

Based on this, the CIA's intelligence program created a historical link and cognitive process for the U.S. government, which led to a change in the equations of this government in the West Asia region.

3.Executive Support

After the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed a cognitive mechanism in decision-making and intervention in the start of the imposed war and support for Saddam Hussein, the battlefield developments compelled American policymakers to utilize this organization not only for extraction, analysis, and transmission to the foreign policy apparatus of the government but also for executive support.

3.1. Informational Operations

The Iraqi government had established intelligence relations with the United States long before the start of the war against Iran. William Casey, the then Director of the CIA, traveled to Baghdad in Ordibehesht 1359, five months before the official outbreak of the war, and stationed a full-time intelligence chief there, even though diplomatic and formal relations between the US and Iraq were apparently severed. After that, the CIA

station chief in Baghdad held regular meetings with Saddam Hussein and provided him with advice (Saadullah Zarei, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 84).

Prior to the start of the war, Iraq also engaged in intelligence activities along the Iran-Iraq borders and attempted to gather information through infiltrators. They also requested assistance from the CIA in this regard (Khaled Hussain Al-Naqib, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 61).

The prominent reason for the United States' spy agency's assistance to Iraq was that the Iraqi intelligence environment, especially in the early days of the war, was completely chaotic and ineffective. In this regard, Wafiq Samarai, the commander of Iraqi intelligence, said:

"Our information services lacked branches, organizations, units, and necessary tools...We used traditional methods and ways to gather military and mobilization information. The responsibility for collecting and preparing intelligence resources and their deployment was delegated to Branch 1. However, it was incapable of carrying out assigned missions. I brought these issues to the attention of the intelligence manager through written notes on September 8th and 15th, 1980, but he was unable to make the necessary changes." (Vafiq Samarai, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 63)

Howard Teicher, one of the senior officers of the CIA, says about this: "The intelligence relationship between the United States and Iraq was no longer an information exchange; it was information devouring! We gave Iraq what it needed to avoid defeat by the Iranians." (Max Perry 1994 AD/1373 SH: 712-713)

These statements clearly demonstrate the CIA's deep support for an incompetent dictator in managing the war. Furthermore, the CIA employed Jordanian security forces, which it had trained, for espionage against Iran. Pars News Agency published this news on 10/02/1360 as follows:

Approximately one thousand and five hundred Jordanian security officials, who have undergone special training courses by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, played an active role as the fifth column behind the war fronts of Iraq and Iran. Additionally, two hundred luxurious villas were purchased in the best residential area of Amman, the capital of Jordan, by the Jordanian government and given as rewards to the Jordanian officers fighting on the front lines against Iran. These houses were used by the Jordanian officers upon their return, and in the event of their death in the war fronts between Iraq and Iran, their families would benefit from them (Saeed Pourdarab, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 196).

Therefore, with the recognition of the United States government, the CIA has entered the implementation phase to strengthen and expand

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

intelligence in Iraq and has also utilized support from its allied countries in this war effort.

3.2. Diplomatic Action

In 1360, Iran paid attention to the liberation of the areas that the Ba'athist army had occupied from their country, and Iranian fighters freed a part of the occupied territories in the south of the country in the operation "Commander-in-Chief Khomeini" on 31/2/60. In the operation "Thamen al-A'imma" on 5/7/60, they broke the siege of Abadan and with the operation "Tariq al-Quds" on 8/9/60; they liberated the city of Bostan and 70 surrounding villages. This process of conquest and liberation posed a threat to the Americans and the fear that Iraq, with its weakness, would contribute to Iran's increasing power. It forced the American intelligence agency to take diplomatic actions and hold meetings with government and intelligence leaders to stop the course of the war.

William Casey, the Director of the CIA at the time, travels in February 1982 (Bahman 1360) from Paris to Amman International Airport in Jordan with a private plane. He goes to meet King Hussein of Jordan. After meeting with the King of Jordan, Casey meets with Saddam's half-brother "Barezan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti," who was the head of the Iraqi Central Intelligence Office. In this meeting, Casey expresses:

"The United States is willing to establish direct intelligence relations with Iraq to ensure that Iraq is capable of defending itself against Iranian attacks. Casey raised details of a program he had about this matter. Casey's concern was primarily about the military situation in southern Iraq, where Iranian tanks were well deployed to take advantage of Iraqi weaknesses. Casey discussed the maps prepared by the CIA regarding the military deployment of Iranian and Iraqi forces and explained that according to these maps, American experts believe that Iranian forces are capable of blocking any Iraqi movements!." (Max Prey, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 698)

According to Casey, the United States was concerned about Iraq being on the verge of a major military defeat. After reaching an agreement, Casey informed Washington through a secure communication network that his mission had been successful. Several months later, two other American officials, including a high-ranking CIA officer, made a second trip to the Middle East. This time they went directly to Baghdad. The Americans had a series of new plans for the reorganization of Iraqi and Iranian military forces, along with them, prepared very carefully by a group of intelligence experts in the United States. In this meeting, in addition to Barzani from Tikrit, CIA officials also met with Saddam Hussein (ibid., 700). Based on this, the American intelligence agency also

entered into diplomatic affairs, and new informational contacts were established between the CIA and Iraqi leaders for the realization of America's policy towards war.

3.3. Operations and Satellite Information Transfer Management

After the liberation of Khorramshahr and Iran taking the initiative, the situation in Iraq was heading towards greater severity. American intelligence analysts once again believed that the fall of the Baghdad government was inevitable, either through a military defeat by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards or through uprisings by Shia groups within Iraq. Meanwhile, uprisings against the government were taking place in the cities of Basra, Hilla, and Nasiriyah. CIA analysts reported that the road to Baghdad was practically open for the Iranians! As a result, President Reagan and CIA Director William Casey decided to reverse the situation and save Iraq. This included providing the information obtained from monitoring Iranian military movements through advanced reconnaissance aircraft like AWACS to the Iraqis. Also, a CIA station was established near the Presidential Palace in Iraq, and the CIA sent a group of its intelligence officers to Baghdad to assist Saddam in defense matters. According to CIA officers' reports, the supervision of some war operations and the operational theater was entrusted to "Robert Gates," "Richard Crutamastoten," and daily operations were handed over to "Bert Dan," an officer in charge of Near East Affairs at the CIA (Max Perry, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 709). Regarding the accurate information and images received by Iraq at that time via satellite, Wafiq Samara'i, the Chief of Iraqi Intelligence, explains:

"The American intelligence services were ahead in terms of informational assistance since late March 1982 (early Farvardin 1361). These intelligence services provided us with a collection of information that was obtained through technical means or by humans. I saw photos that were taken by satellites of military targets and the mobilization of Iranian forces. We could easily observe images of soldiers undergoing military training in Iranian barracks, even identifying someone who made a wrong move during a parade. When we examined cement factories, we counted the number of bags being loaded onto trucks at each stage. Satellites scrutinized all Iranian movements on the frontlines, from tank and artillery movements to the shifting of bases and storage of bridging equipment. Satellites also reported the results of air and missile attacks. According to the guidelines conveyed from above, we were not allowed to show anyone the espionage satellite photos. However, they would show these photos to me for viewing purposes." (Wafiq Samara'I, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 155)

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

This informational preparation was intended for Iran to not be victorious in its subsequent operations. Because at this time, Iran was preparing for a major operational readiness to pursue the invading enemy, find a secure point for itself, and recapture the remaining territories from the enemy. This operation, titled "Ramadan," was initiated by the order of Colonel Sayyid Shirazi, the commander of the army, and Mohsen Rezaei Mirghaed, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, at 21:30 on 22/04/1361 (Army Political Beliefs: 6/1387/64).

This operation, known as the largest armored military operation of the Ground Forces after World War II, continued in five phases from the Iranian combatants' region, and they advanced up to 5 kilometers towards Basra. However, contrary to usual and with the advice of Americans, Iraqi soldiers had taken a defensive stance against this operation, rather than an offensive one! Despite the achievements it had for Iran, this operation was halted on 09/05/1361 (July 31, 1982), and did not reach its ultimate goal. Wafiq Samarai, the Intelligence Commander of Iraq, speaks about the role of the CIA organization:

During this operation, I met three members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They had come to directly announce their readiness to provide necessary information about Iran. Since late March 1982, they had been providing us with this information through an Arab country. The Americans brought very detailed maps and plans regarding Iranian units, as well as explanatory sketches derived from satellite images. At that stage of the war, we were in dire need of such maps and plans (Wafiq Samara'I, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 101).

After the Ramadan operation, America decided to increase its military forces in the Persian Gulf. The New York Times writes about it:

"The renewed reliance on irregular warfare with repeated emphasis by the Reagan administration on covert operations carried out by the CIA is consistent. According to Weinberger's (Secretary of Defense) directive, the United States must be capable of prevailing in low-level conflicts and achieving its objectives without direct confrontation whenever it is advantageous!" (Hossein Yekta, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 353)

Based on operational support and informational and methodological assistance, the CIA's support for the Iraqi regime, which was at war with Iran, demonstrated more than ever before that this intelligence agency had entered the arena of management and overt confrontation with Iran with clear and direct performance and has considered the increasing continuity of Iraq's victory as its sole goal of regional dominance.

3.4. Equipment Operations

In addition to providing intelligence support during the implementation phase, the United States played a significant role in supporting Iraq by

providing extensive assistance in the procurement of weapons. To achieve this, new connections were established by the CIA to deliver funds, weapons, and necessary facilities to Saddam Hussein. Consequently, international laws that prevented warmongering were disregarded, as Security Council resolutions, which had approved the imposition of maximum restrictions on the sale of anything that could escalate the ongoing conflict between the two countries, were violated from the very beginning of the imposed war (Contemporary International Studies and Research Cultural Institute, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 41). However, the CIA pursued its assigned tasks regardless of these laws.

3.4.1. Intermediary Companies

One of the intermediary companies involved in arms sales to Iraq was American Steel, which was considered the old branch of an Israeli company. The CEO of the company was Larry Hickey. There were two managers in this company, one of whom was Robert Johnson. Johnson had a deep connection with "Fort Bragg," the home of the legendary Delta Force, which was financially supported by the CIA. Johnson had close relationships with arms manufacturers and represented several companies that produced bomb fuses, artillery components, and other items that make up an arms dealer's inventory. Johnson had friendly relations with Robert Gates, the Deputy of William Casey (CIA Director)."

Richard Smith was another manager of a private company who, like most employees of American Steel, had a background in the military and often accompanied Robert Johnson (*ibid.*, 40-41). Another person named Hubsh, originally from Jordan and fluent in Arabic, played the role of intermediary between the United States, Jordan, and Iraq, and Johnson and Smith considered him the best person for these communications and arms transfers to Jordan and Iraq. Hubsh describes in his memoirs the membership of Johnson and Smith in the CIA and says that after several meetings with them, they revealed more details and ultimately admitted that they were former CIA operatives! They also introduced Hubsh to their lawyer, who was also a former agency operative. Hubsh recalls that the lawyer constantly warned them not to use the word "Iraq" even in conversations and insisted on using the word "Jordan" instead. Hubsh continues by saying that the only problem these individuals had was how to conceal the transportation of goods to Iraq using forged documents! (Iran's Lawsuits, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 42). The CIA pursued arms sales and transfers through these individuals and other intermediaries.

3.4.2. Intermediary Banks

Financial support from the United States to Iraq also played a significant role in securing the weaknesses of the Iraqis in the war. These aids were accompanied by large and guaranteed loans. In February 1983 (Bahman

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

1361), a group of high-ranking members of the Reagan administration approved the first guaranteed loan worth \$230 million for shipments to Iraq, including wheat, barley, egg, rice, and legumes. This process continued, and before the end of that year, the Reagan administration allocated approximately \$400 million in guaranteed loans to Iraq. However, the repayment of these loans and financial support by Reagan and his deputy, George Bush, was carried out through the Atlanta branch of the Italian Bank Lavoro, using American taxpayers' deposits to transfer military technology to Baghdad without financial auditing (Allen Friedman, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 169). During James Baker's tenure at the US Treasury Department, the issue of the American branch of the Italian Bank Lavoro was exposed, and it became clear that illegal and non-compliant relationships with international banking laws were taking place between the American branch of this bank and Iraq under the supervision of the CIA over many years, which was also considered a violation of international laws by the CIA espionage organization.

3.4.3. Weapon Delivery

The agents of the CIA organization, under the cover of the mentioned companies, were responsible for providing communication and weapon delivery to Iraq. Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, codenamed Abu Ali, traveled to the United States to purchase weapons and delivered a billion-dollar list of missiles, electronic defense items, tanks, helicopters, and more to Johnson. In 1982, Johnson sent his message to Iraq to inform them that Iraq's purchasing list was being completed (*ibid.*, 455). In order to facilitate the transfer of equipment, the Reagan administration announced in Congress on February 26, 1982 (Esfand 7, 1360), that Iraq would be removed from the list of terrorist countries because the CIA had assured Iraq that sufficient weapons would be provided through third countries (Marin Valimese, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 108).

Given the strict prohibition on sending weapons to Iraq according to the laws of the United States and the United Nations, individuals who supported the companies and facilitated the entry and exit and intermediaries confessed, according to Robert Johnson, were as follows: First, William Casey, the then head of the CIA; second, Robert Gates, deputy to William Casey; third, Judge William Clark, who was Reagan's national security advisor. America provided all of Iraq's military requests, from uniforms to warplanes, and William Casey personally oversaw Iraq's access to everything it needed (Bahram Nawazani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 184).

Furthermore, William Casey also met with King Hussein of Jordan during his missions in the Middle East as the head of the CIA. According to Casey, Jordan was a suitable cover for covert US operations in the areas

of arms or intelligence. Jordan was also bordered by Iraq, and the port of Aqaba was considered an ideal port for shipments coming from the Red Sea and being transferred by land to Baghdad. The long-standing presence of the CIA in the small kingdom of Jordan also made the situation better for covert transfer of weapons (Islamic Republic Newspaper, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 3). Accordingly, the American spy agency, disregarding international regulations and laws, had extensive and deep activities in the transfer of equipment and weapons to Iraq, and in the implementation phase of American policies, it was not accountable to any domestic or foreign entity.

3.5. Support for the Production and Transfer of Chemical Weapons

In addition to informational and equipment support, the CIA also provided assistance in the transfer of mass destruction and anti-human weaponry to Iraq, which is considered one of the most brutal tools in the ruthless mechanism. One of these weapons of mass destruction was cluster bombs. Cluster bombs are usually about 13 feet long and weigh approximately 2,000 pounds, containing a cluster of small bombs inside. These bombs, dropped by bomber planes, fighter jets, helicopters, artillery, rockets, and missiles, contaminate an extensive area equivalent to two or three football fields with these small bombs (Frida Bregan, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 54).

The negative and inhumane characteristics of this type of bomb pose significant dangers to the lives of civilians and residential areas. The majority of the production of this type of bomb is carried out by American companies, and this country has not adhered to any of the restrictive international treaties regarding the use of these weapons, nor has it accepted responsibility for the casualties resulting from its own warfare. The CIA assisted the Saddam regime in producing cluster bombs. According to the London-based newspaper "Financial Times," the company "International Signal Control" has been involved in the clandestine transfer of technology for manufacturing their own bombs to Iraq (Farhad Darvishi Se Telani, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 68).

This Chilean company, which delivered cluster bomb components to Iraq, obtained the initial production plans for these bombs directly from the CIA. The CIA, by issuing licenses for cover end-users, supplied the bomb fuses to the Chilean company to be sent to Iraq via Jordan (Marin Valimseh, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 96). Carlos Cardon's cooperation with Iraq began in early 1983 and continued for several years. With the support of the CIA and the US Army, he supplied his equipment needs from various factories in New Orleans and Los Angeles. The production cost of each cluster bomb in those factories was \$7,000 or \$19,000 cheaper than rival factories in Europe. In the summer of 1989, Robert Gates, the deputy director of the CIA at the time, visited the Carlos Cardon factory and

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

closely observed the presence of American-imported equipment in the factory, but never prevented such activities! (Ellen Friedman, 2016 AD/١٣٩٥ SH: 96). This bomb, which belongs to the family of weapons of mass destruction, was repeatedly used by Iraq against Iran, and international organizations never prevented its construction and delivery by the CIA. The CIA carried out its inhumane operations and plans with this bomb and encouraged Iraq to use it.

Conclusion

The research findings indicate that according to the "Information Dependency on Policy" theory, the Central Intelligence Agency of America has served the U.S. government in the cognitive and operational dimensions as follows in relation to the Iraq war against Iran.

Cognitive
Gaining information and introducing the Middle East / Iran and Iraq
Accompaniment and continuous communication with Iraq and certain political movements in this country".
Political-Intelligence Exploitation of Individuals/Saddam Hussein
Assessment of the military forces' status in Iran and Iraq
Gathering information to make a decision to start a war.
Executive
Intelligence support operations for Iraq
The diplomatic action of the heads of the CIA organization to help Iraq
Management of some military operations of the war
Transmission of technological information
Equipment and weapons support
Provision of financial mechanisms
Executive support for the manufacture of chemical weapons

The CIA, the American intelligence agency, has been using Saddam Hussein as a cognitive mechanism for years before the war. They implemented a part of their interventionist plans in West Asia through him, and the ultimate goal of this mechanism was to encourage him to wage war against Iran. In the second phase, the executive mechanism was put on the agenda of the CIA, and the CIA remained connected to Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war, providing him with extensive intelligence, electronic, armament, and tactical support to suppress the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States and the CIA aimed to dominate the Middle East, which is considered a strategic and geopolitical region, and the US intelligence agency pursued this goal by intervening heavily in this war, disregarding international laws and

solely acting to protect its interests. Due to the infiltration of their country and their intelligence agency into international organizations, there was never an absolute prevention of the actions and operations of the CIA.

References

- Ardestani, H. (1999 AD/1378 SH). *The Iran-Iraq War: Confrontation of Strategies*. Tehran: Sepah Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards' War College.
- Timerman, K. (2016 AD/1395 SH). *Death Merchants: Untold Stories of the Iraq-Iran War*. Tehran: Rasa.
- Pari, M. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Eclipse*. (Salehyar, Gh. Trans). Tehran: Ettelaat Publication.
- Pourdarab, S. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Sacred Defense History Calendar (Consecutive Strikes)*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center.
- . (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Sacred Defense History Calendar (Overcoming Riqabiyah)*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center.
- . (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Sacred Defense History Calendar (The Dismissal of Bani-Sadr, the Beginning of a Transformation)*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center.
- Tabaraniyan, S. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Sleepwalkers*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center.
- Hussein Naqib, Kh. (1990 AD/1369 SH). *Ba'ath Party and War (Volume III)*. Translated by Mohammad Husain Zawar Ka'aba. Tehran: Artistic Circle of the Propaganda Organization.
- Shahbazi, A. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Monarchy*. Tehran: Ettelaat.
- Qaznafari, K. (2015 AD/1394 SH). *Interventions*. (Volume 4).

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

Keyhan. Muslim students following the path of Imam. (n.d.). *Iran in the Revolution*. Tehran: Center for Publication of Espionage Documents.

Muslim students following the path of Imam. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *Delusion of Overthrow*. Tehran: Center for Publication of Espionage Documents.

Dorudiyan, M. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *From Beginning to End: A Journey through the Iran-Iraq War*. Tehran: Center for Studies and Research of Sepah Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards' War College.

Lotfollah Zadegan, A. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *The Chronicles of Iran-Iraq War, Book 49*. Tehran: Center for Documents and Research on the Holy Defense.

———. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *The Chronicles of Iran-Iraq War, Book 21*. Tehran: Center for Documents and Research on the Holy Defense.

———. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *The Chronicles of Iran-Iraq War, Book 22*. Tehran: Center for Documents and Research on the Holy Defense.

Yekta, H. (2010 AD/1389 SH). *The Chronicles of Iran-Iraq War, Book 20 (Crossing the Border)*. Tehran: Center for Documents and Research on the Holy Defense.

Samarai, W. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *The Ruins of the Eastern Gate*. Tehran: Center for Documents and Research on the Holy Defense.

Ideological-Political Artesh (2008 AD/1387 SH). *The Role of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Army in the Eight Years of Sacred Defense*. Book 6, First Edition.

Abdul Khaliq Kazem, M. (2004 AD/1383 SH). *Global Developments in the Thinking of the New Empire*. Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance Publications.

Valimseh, M. (2013 AD/1392 SH). *The Strongest Partner in Crime*. (Khorrami, M.A. Trans). Marzoboom Publishing.

- Navazani, B. (2004 AD/1383 SH). *Behavioral Patterns of the United States in Confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documents.
- Darvishi Se Talani, F. (2011 AD/1390 SH). *Iran-Iraq War: Questions and Answers*. Sepah Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami.
- Friedman, A. (2016 AD/1395 SH). *Spider's House*. Gholami, M. Trans). Ettela'at.
- Dehqan, A. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Untold Stories of the War: Memories of Martyr General Ali Sayyad Shirazi*. First Edition. Office of Literature and Art of Resistance.
- Babaei, G. (2018 AD/1397 SH). *American Dream*. Bethat 27.
- Khomeini, R. (1998 AD/1377 SH). *Sahifeh Noor*. Volume 15. Organization for Cultural Documentation of the Islamic Revolution.
- Mir Mohammad, M. (2011 AD/1390 SH). *Intelligence Agencies and Foreign Policy: A Case Study on the Role of the CIA in US Foreign Policy*. Tehran: Institute for Cultural Studies and Contemporary International Affairs.
- Bloom, W. (2009 AD/1388 SH). *Crushing Hope*. Tehran: Center for the Documentation of the Islamic Revolution.
- Ghavam, A. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *Principles of Foreign Policy and International Politics*. 11th Edition. Tehran: Samt Publications.
- Kinser, A. (2011 AD/1390 SH). *Overthrow: A Century of Regime Change Operations by the United States from Hawaii to Iraq*. (Ahooei, M.H. Trans). Tehran: Thaleth.
- Zare'i, S. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "Everyone Was with Him." *Mothallath Weekly*, 3 Mehr.
- Disclosure of the Role of the CIA in the Ba'athist Coup in Iraq After 40 Years. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Kayhan newspaper*. 28 Esfand.

The Functional Mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency of America in the Face of the Imposed War on Iraq against Iran with Emphasis on the Initial Stages of the War

- Covert Operation. (1994 AD/1373 SH). "A Part of America and Iraq's Conspiracy." *Jomhuriye Islami newspaper*. 3 Aban.
- Brigand, F. (2007 AD/1386 SH). *Siyahat Gharb Magazine*. Mordad, Issue 49.
- Shalom, A. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "Who made him a general?" (Golmohammadi, A. Trans). *Zamaneh Monthly*. Aban.
- Rajaei, M. (2003AD/1382 SH). "Black Bride Oil." *Kayhan newspaper*, 6 Shahrivar.
- Drilandou, M. (2004 AD/1383 SH). *Siyahat Gharb Magazine*, Issue 18.
- Asgari, M. (2010 AD/1389 SH). "A Critical Approach to the Theory of Soft Power." *Rahbord-e Defa'i Quarterly*, 8th year, Issue 28.
- Pishegahifard, Z. et al. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "The Position of Soft Power in National Interests with Emphasis on the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Rahbord Quarterly*. Vol, 23, no.61.
- Sanjabi Shirazi, J. (2010 AD/1389 SH). "Conceptualization and Genealogy of Power and Soft War." *Political Policy, Defense, and Security Quarterly*. Vol.1, no.2.
- Delirpour, P. (2012 AD/1391 SH). "Decline of Soft Power of the United States of America." *Dual-Quarterly Soft Power*. Vol.2, no.7.
- Jahanbin, F., Emami, A. (2014 AD/1393 SH). "Social Capital as a Soft Power Communication Circle." *Soft Security, Soft Threat Quarterly*. Vol.4, no.10.
- Keyvanhosseini, A. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "The Impact of Post-September 11 Afghanistan Developments and Scenarios." *Afghanistan Transformations Articles Collection*. Tehran: Andisheh Sazan-e Noor.
- Ganbari, S. (2017 AD/1396 SH). *The Role of the CIA in US Foreign Policy with an Emphasis on the Iraq Crisis*. No. 39.

- Vaezi, H. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Terrorism: The Roots of Terrorism and the Objectives of the United States in Confronting the Islamic World*. Tehran: Soroush.
- Molana, H. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *America and the Global Catastrophe*. Edited by Karim and Adele Feyzi. Tehran: Islamic Culture Publishing Office.
- Institute for Contemporary Studies and Research on International Affairs (2004 AD/1383 SH). *Iran's Lawsuits*. Tehran.
- www.defapress.ir - The Largest Tank Operation after World War II. July 21, News Code: 353552.
- Nye, J.S. (1990 AD/1369 SH). "Soft power." *Foreign policy*. No. 80.
- Shukman, H. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in 21 st Century*. London: St. Ermins Press.
- Holt, P.M. (1995 AD/1374 SH). *Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Warner, M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). "Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence." *Studies in Intelligence*. Vol. 46, no. 3.
- Central Intelligence Agency. (1999 AD/1378 SH). *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: CIA Office of Public Affairs.