

Land Reforms of Pahlavi II and Its Social and Economic Consequences(1340-1357 SH)

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Abstract

The present study aimed to etiology of land reform and its consequences based on social anomie approach by scrutinizing historical events and documents. To this aim, with a descriptive-analytical method, explain the social and economic consequences of land reforms. The main question is: 'What was the nature of land reform and what its socio-economic consequences are?' The main hypothesis is that farmers lost their social law (solidarity) and economic independence (self-sufficiency) after land reform. The results indicated that the reforms were not internal and were carried out under pressure from the government and abroad. The wandering of farmers after land reforms led to anomie, i.e., the lack of functioning norms and caused a fragmentation of society. Farmers in the socioeconomic realm were out of balance and suffered from socioeconomic mess. The liberation of a rural community from solidarity and the problem of a self-sustaining economy made farmers face many crises. Social crisis and economic poverty threw society into anomalies. Social crisis and economic poverty threw society into anomalies. As a result, self-sufficient farmers and villagers, with high correlations with the pre-land-reforms, consequently divided the land and villagers migration to the cities, were caught up in social anomie.

Keywords: Land Reform, Pahlavi II, Villagers, Anomie, Social and Economic Turmoil, Farmers.

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Introduction

Land reform was one of the most crucial political, social and economic events in the field of property, land and agriculture in the contemporary round. The reforms of the Pahlavi era began on 19/10/1340 and came into force with the referendum of 6/11/1341. Land reform had three phases. After World War II, the U.S. had included land reforms in countries under its influence as part of its foreign policy agenda. Land reforms in underdeveloped countries such as South America, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe began to reform the land during the period 1964 and 1965. In conclusion, land reform in Iran was also an extrovert policy (Bigdeli and Rana'i, 2016 AD/1395 SH:70).

With the implementation of the land reform program of the 1340s, the peasant farming system and the landowner's domination were permanently disintegrated in Iran's villages. In the 1330s, the Shah sold part of the royal land to the peasants. In the 40s, due to pressure from the Kennedy government, the resurgence of the National Front and the calculation that land reform would destroy land power in favor of state power in the countryside and make landowner villagers loyal to their regime, it expanded and sustained the mentioned program to the extent of a comprehensive land reform. The problems discussed in this paper were the analysis of the social and economic consequences of the social disintegration of farmers and economic dependence on the state.

According to the above preliminaries, the present study, after investigating the situation of farmers, especially in the village, discusses about the role of land reform in the turmoil of their situation as a socio-economic issue. In other words, answer the question of 'What was the social and economic consequence of land reform?'

The research qualitative method was descriptive-analytical and fundamental purpose. Data collection tools and required information were collected from library resources and historical evidence. The findings show that land reforms have had many social and economic consequences, dissatisfaction and confrontation with the government in land reforms regarding the tribal texture and existing the local cohesion and solidarity between farmers and landowners on the one hand, and economic independence from the government considering their self-sufficiency; after the land reforms in these two categories, they faced a major challenge.

1. Research Background

The background of the study is: Dariush Rahmanian and Mohammad Javad Abdollahi (2016 AD/1396 SH), "From Hidden Unemployment to Overt Unemployment: the Impact of Land Reforms on the Recognition

of Unemployment," in this article the authors believe that the reduction of the development program in 1320 and 1330 reduced urban employment and unemployment. This was the result of restrictions on land distributed with land reform and migration. Morteza Manshadi and Reza Sarhadi Ghahri (2021 AD/1400 SH), in the "Pathological Study of the Process of Implementing Land Reform Program from the Anthropological View of the Government from 1961 to 1971," believe that the conditions resulting from land reforms, disrupted national and local power. Land reforms had caused the political situation fragile in the Pahlavi era. Maryam Gholiji and Morteza Nourai (2020 AD/1399 SH), "The Impact of Land Reforms from 1341 to 1357/ 1962 to 1978 on Urban Population: Ilam's Example Research" was to balance land ownership and to benefit the villagers from property, which did not happen. It caused the loss of landowners' independence and reduced their influence, and the economic situation of the peasants became weaker, leading to migration from village to city. The distinction of the paper is that it presents a new analysis of the land reform consequences in the socio-economic realm.

2. Theoretical Approach: Social Anomie

In his studies, historical sociology strives to gain an accurate understanding of the society situation in its historical past. This area of history is examined and explained by social historians or in the form of historical sociology. In historical sociology, the understanding of the nature, appearance of problems or social events and past events are examined and explained by sociology and theories. In this paper, the theory of "Anomie" (lack of norm or anomaly of Anomie) as an analytical framework and theory has been used to investigate the trend of social and economic changes in Iran during the Pahlavi II era that occurred as a result of land reforms. Durkheim considers anomie as a result of an anomaly in division of labor, which is transformed by changing the mechanical correlation of simple societies into a more complex organic correlation common in industrial societies (Durkheim, 1984 AD:302).

Although Parsons has not specifically addressed social anomie, parsons' view, imbalances in the structures of society cause crisis and turmoil in society. Talcott Parsons' approach has a great conceptual affinity with Durkheim's anomie theory. Parsons theory has been investigated in the most revolutions occurrence (Parsons, 1968 AD/1346 SH: 84). The concept of anomie has gained great importance in sociological and historical sociological studies and in this paper, the Durkheim theory of anomie is attended for explanation. Parsons has

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used to define and describe the social status of an unbalanced society outside the structures (Parsons, 1968 AD/1346 SH: 84; Durkheim, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 280). The consequences of society resulting from the lack of social discipline of the state and individuals in society are a form of turmoil (Hilbert, 1989 AD: 31).

According to Durkheim, anomie in society is equivalent to sin in religion and belief. If one's religion and the collective imagination and beliefs that they believe in are insulted and its dignity is damaged, anomie occurs within the individual. In Durkheim's view, lack of order and rule in economic affairs, in addition to affecting it from the non-economic (socio-political) realm, but also reduces the moral sense in society (Durkheim, 2002 AD/ 1381 SH: 64).

Durkheim believes that, in social crises the absolute poverty is not important, but the suddenness of changes and the resulting equilibrium is vital. The middle circle connects the social and economic crisis, aspirations, desires and expectations of individuals. If economic and social aspirations are out of balance with changes in society, the situation of crisis in society will arise. Regarding the inevitability of social and economic turmoil, dissatisfaction, frustration and wandering occur in society. Distress and turmoil in society are the result of rapid industrialization and sudden and related changes within human beings (insatiable/expectations) which have been addressed in two effects of "Division of Labor" and "Suicide" of Durkheim. Factors of solidarity and social discipline are the result of economic self-sufficiency and collective conscience. Factors threatening the correlation between forced labor division, improper and unjust rules that lead to a decrease in dignity and social base and will lead to turmoil.

The use of social anomie framework in the present study provides the possibility to investigate the cause of wandering and farmers wandering through the concepts of theory and explain its social and economic consequence. In fact, according to the social anomie, society experiences an anomalous situation through a disorganized, turbulent and chaotic transition. Social co-ordination in Durkheim's view is a form of community order and the foundations own order in which individuals of a society are interconnected and harmonious (Durkheim, 2002 AD/ 1381 SH: 72). The socioeconomic rupture as a result of turmoil is from the perspective of Durkheim anomie, which here is the present issue based on historical evidence.

3. Agricultural Status (Owner and Farmer) before Land Reform
Survey and census conducted by the Census Bureau before land reform (1960 AD/1339 SH) had estimated land utilization rate about 1.877.299

hectares and overall agricultural lands were about 11.356.254 hectares. That is, about 11.3 million hectares of agricultural lands were allocated to agriculture and cultivation from 1.8 million land users. In fact, about 43% of all exploitable lands were for peasants, more than half of the land was allocated to agriculture and less than half in pieces to the smallholder. As a result, the amount of land (43%) allocated for exploitation was distributed between renters, peasants-property, peasants-renters, property-renters and peasant-property (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, 1960 AD/ 1339 SH: 1-33; Azimi, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 21-83). From 1336 until land reform, the lands of 1400 villages with a level of 200,000 hectares were divided among more than 42,000 farmers (Pahlavi, 1979 AD/1389 SH: 93).

Land reforms were approved in Dey 1340 and after investigations; Maragheh was recognized as suitable for implementation regarding the majority of landowners (Rahmani, 1969 AD/ 1348 SH: 263).

Land reforms were carried out in three phases: First, the first phase of land reform began in Dey 1340 and was carried out for one year with the passage of the Amendments Bill. The second phase started from 18/11/1341 and was approved and implemented until 13/12/1343. The third stage started from 1347 and ended until 1351. The first phase was proposed and implemented by Ali Amini and Hassan Arsanjani, minister of agriculture. Of course, this program was more progressive than the Shah wanted. Under the program, the owners' large ownership was limited to a maximum of one village, and the government bought the rest of each owner's property, taking into account the amount of tax the owner had already paid for it.

The move was in the government's favor. That's because the owners didn't pay taxes before. And then he sold the properties to peasants who had the right to a share with the owner. At this stage, the land reforms of the handsome and the peasants did not own the land without the right of the land. Before ending the first phase of land reforms, the landowners' objections, the movement of peasants and the shah's jealousy, out of doubt about the possibility of Arsanjani and Amini's popularity as reform leaders, led to the dismissal of Amini's cabinet and the removal of Arsanjani from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The second phase of land reform began when, in addition to the owner, the woman and his children could each take on a village. Machine-growing land and gardens were exempted from the reform law, landowners had the right to rent, sell, or share it between themselves and the peasants, buy the Nasaq right (The right of a fair division of water and land) of farmers, or form a farming joint stock company with them. Now the Shah attributed land reform to himself,

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calling it a white revolution against the red and sivalistic revolution. In the White Revolution, in addition to land reforms, a few less important principles were included; the sale of shares of state-owned factories to pay the land price to landowners was one of the principles that turned landowners into industrial capitalists. After 1346, the third phase of the reforms began when all the land left in the landowners' hands was leased to the peasants in the second phase, and small peasants grew, but the government, meanwhile, encouraged large machinery and a large agricultural joint stock company, including several industrial farming villages in large areas. The Pahlavi government's goal of land reform was to reduce landowner power, develop its power and dominance, and industrialize society (Hoagland, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 101).

Land reform had a political approach that was carried out from outside Iranian society and was carried out under outside pressure (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2009 AD/ 1388 SH: 215). The government's goal was to remove agricultural land from the hands of large landowners and create smallholders and re-distribute land among farmers (Katuzian, 2000 AD/1379 SH:189). 'Was land reform a success and an achievement for the government and the nation?' This question has been posed and investigated by many researchers. Although the question is now also under consideration, there will only be socio-economic consequences of land reform. It is necessary to reread, that 'Was land reform a success?'

This question was conducted by Hoagland, an English researcher. He believes that by the 1350s, 93 percent of peasants had a share of landowners, and this may be a success for the Shah's government compared to land reforms in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, since less than 10 percent of the peasants owned land in these countries. On the other hand, this researcher believes that land reform was not a success for the Iranian people. "Practical success in terms of real positive benefits for the peasants subject to the law was practically zero. Iran's land reforms were practically a conservative program with few positive benefits. In 1350, the majority of villagers were no better economically status than in the years before the program was implemented." (Hoagland, 1973 AD/1351 SH: 63)

The reason for the unsuccessful land reforms had several reasons, it should be noted that half of the rural households were not subject to the Land Reform Act because they did not have a formal contract and did not have the right to a share. The majority of the peasants who owned the land acquired small and inferior plots of land, and half of the land was not divided in principle and remained in the possession of large landowners. Figures on the land area of farmers subject to the law

illustrate the problems of land reform in the villages. The ownership of the absentee owner was largely moderated but did not go away. The peasants owned land, but with this ownership, they only provided their minimum livelihoods because, according to the provisions of that time, at least 7 hectares of land were needed to provide for the livelihoods of a peasant family. The peasants, without the right of Nasaq, still remained without land and became poorer. The average peasants and intermediaries got better, and then the number of average peasants increased. The vast majority of villagers were low-land peasants or village wage-earners who faced social and economic problems.

4. Social Status Resulting from Land Reforms and Its Consequences

Hussein 'Ala, the government's minister of the court, had announced his report that the plan had failed since the start of the land reform. His reason for the inefficiency of the reforms was the lack of increase in agricultural production, prosperity in agriculture and improvement of the livelihoods of the producers and social problems (Rostami, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 112). In addition to 'Ala, Asadullah 'Alam did not accept land reforms (Tafazzoli, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 63).

One of the crucial reasons for negative view of land reform was its harmful political, social and economic consequences. Although agricultural joint stock companies, agro-industry and cooperative companies were established in the villages to provide seeds, fertiliser and banking facilities (Keshawarz, 1970 AD/1349 SH: 119), the division of land between farmers without support caused the government to appoint managers to run the company and cooperatives, which caused inefficiency regarding the misuse of their position and managerial weakness and inability to manage the company or profitability and lack of knowledge of farmers; and the farmers abandoned their lands and migrated to the lands. By traveling to Iran and observing the social structure of Tehran, Foucault divided Tehran into two parts: The city of the rich and the city of the poor, and considers the inhabitants of the poor as villagers and farmers who had been forced to settle in Halabiabads (suburbs) and run away (displaced and wandered) from the village to the city as a result of the land reforms failure (Foucault, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 25).

After land reforms, traditional land exploitation in rural areas had been met with fundamental change. The fragmentation of agricultural lands had reduced the exploitation of land, thus reducing the system of mass production and sharing. What was known in the historical rural structure as Sahara, Bunch (a form of cooperative and rural and local

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cooperation) and Haratheh (traditional plowing with cows and iron) had been disrupted. The irrigation method led agriculture from aqueducts, kariz (kahriz) and springs to a new industry that was the use of deep and semi-deep wells. The result of the decrease in production reduced the role of farmers in the economy and further separation of the city from the village. Iran's urban population was about 31.4 percent in 1335, five years before land reforms, after three years of land reform, Iran's urban population had increased by about 40 percent. At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1357, Iran's urban population had reached 48%, leading to a disturbance in the demographic balance between the village and the city (Abadian, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 5).

Migration and marginalization of villagers and farmers in cities were the consequences of land reform. The increase and intensity of rural migration to cities were mostly pleasant people, Nasaq owners (agricultural right to cultivate on land) and agricultural workers who moved towards agricultural joint stock companies and agro-industry companies that depended on industrial development (Milani, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 102).

The dismantling of the village's social structure was the result of land reforms, which Durkheim has called social insufficiency due to sudden changes. With land reforms, 50 percent of the pleasant people moved from the village to the cities, a move the government had caused farmers to wander. Land reform brought about detrimental social change, with effects for decades to come. The second Pahlavi government's goal was to change the social fabric of the villages, because of the importance of its solidarity, as well as the large population (more than 75% at the time of land reform) that the village was in place. After land reforms, a fundamental change in the social fabric of the villages emerged and rural cooperatives and government culture houses were formed in the villages (Pahlavi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 95). Rural cooperative companies faced various failures in seed distribution, lack of executive facilities and lack of economic support and administrative disability could not play the role of owners before reform (Ebtehaj, 1979 AD/1371 SH: 540). Land reform was in the industrial process and modernization of the Second Pahlavi era (Ajami, 1973 AD: 68).

Many farmers and villagers sold their land after land reforms and migrated from the village to major cities, especially the metropolis of Tehran. Newly arrived farmers and villagers in the city worked as unskilled and non-professional workers in industrial factories and transit capital companies as simple and unskilled workers. During this period, there was no labor law and social security insurance that could

support the worker and his family. Most villagers and farmers were deprived of social security insurance and health services, disability insurance, unemployment benefits, seasonal and construction workers' protection, and so on. Land reforms had forced farmers to live in harsh social conditions, and the imposition had led to acceptance of the class gap between rich and poor and discrimination.

In the early 1340s, more than two-thirds of Iran's population was made up of rural residents. Nearly half of that population was poor and had no specific jobs. The rural population worked as seasonal workers in landlords' lands with large and big lands (Statistical Almanac, 1341).

After land reforms, most of the villagers became small landowners with fragmented land and in 1344; nearly 62 percent of the workers in Tehran who were immigrants were working as simple and unskilled workers. 12% of rural migrants and farmers in the city were semi-skilled workers and about 14% of them were skilled workers. In 1351, about 91 percent of Tehran's guards who worked in public places in the city of rich people houses, organizations, and government offices were immigrants and farmer villages, 72 percent of who had abandoned agriculture in the village and came to the city (Abadian, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 10).

The shah's goal of land reform in the social and urban population was to bring about a change in the proportion between urban and rural populations. Mohammad Reza Shah believed that if the current situation (1341), which has shaped about 75 percent of the country's population as villagers and is farming in the village, if the situation does not reverse, the country will not progress.

The Shah believed that Iran should, like the United States, where only 9.5 percent of the population was employed in agriculture, and that Iran should reside in the countryside in the same way as the United States in order to provide the food needed and the rest of the population would migrate to the cities (Pars newspaper, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 9).

Urban development and consumer satisfaction for the Shah were among the main priorities in land reform (Katouzian, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 274). The increase in urban population in Iran in the Pahlavi era had the reverse response, increasing the population in the city had caused a lack of social security; land reforms disrupted the balance and the biosocial system.

5. Economic Conditions Resulting from Land Reforms and Its Consequences

After the land reforms, the method of smallholder production expanded. 25% of the cultivated lands were managed as smallholder. The division

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of land between the villagers turned a large population of farmers into smallholders, and nearly 2.5 million rural households became smallholders. The goal of land reform was to develop an industrial-commercial agricultural production method (Meier, 1989 AD: 463).

Land reform happened not at the request of farmers and landowners, but unilaterally by the Pahlavi government, under pressure and support from foreign investment. In dependent capital, the rural market and farmers opened to capital and cheap labor was provided to the newly needed capitalists (Hoagland, 2002 AD/ 1381 SH: 130-141).

One of the reasons for increasing the surplus labor after land reform was mechanization and machining of agriculture. The big owners were thinking about selling and commercializing their crops, while small rural farmers sought to provide essential basic necessities and their food products. This situation has changed completely with increasing the oil prices and changing the agricultural policy and ended at the expense of small farmers (Amid, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 191-195).

In addition, the development of industrial-commercial agriculture in rural areas was destroyed. The pattern of livelihood agriculture and self-sufficiency collapsed and the traditional production method changed to modern production method and led to the collapse of the traditional economic context (Furan, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 479; Brzezinski, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 17).

Land reforms led to the development of monetary relations among farmers, which had not been prevalent before. Before the land reforms, monetary relations to the village were not prevalent or at least minimally prevalent. After land reforms of farmers who thought of self-sustaining production to industrial-commercial production, changing attitudes toward agriculture (economic and commercial perspective) led to the expansion of monetary and market relations. In addition to conflicts in monetary and market relations, farmers were also caught up in long-term (15-year) installments resulting from the purchase of land from the government. The crucial problem for farmers was the repayment of land purchased from the government (Ivanov, 1977 AD/1356 SH: 235).

If farmer was unable to pay the installment of its purchased land, it would have to leave its land to the usurer (Statistical Center of Iran, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 112-116).

One example is the weakening of agriculture in the years following the land reforms in the years 1341-1355. Although investment in agricultural lands and cultivation increased, productivity remained low and failed (Graham, 1980 AD/1358 SH: 44). After the land reforms, large farmers were supported by the government, receiving long-term,

low-interest loans from the government, whose high loans and long repayments had satisfied the large landowners.

Micro-rural farmers had started farming by redistributing land on a smaller scale (some were less than half an acre), receiving loans from rural cooperatives established in the villages with very small amounts and high interest with short repaid (Emami Khoei and Ziaei, 1999 AD/1387 SH: 63-81). These farmers had no interest in staying in the village and addressing agriculture.

Land reforms were carried out under the slogan of strengthening and supporting farmers, and at the same time as the Kennedy land reforms (U.S. President) had announced to the Shah that U.S. support for Iran would be a focus on long-term economic growth and that land reform would be an infrastructure for development (Alexander and Nunes, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 476), but it had no positive impact on farmers' economic power. As much as large farmers had benefited and prospered from land reform, they had suffered just as much as small farmers. The losses of small farmers had caused problems in their repatriation and received high-interest loans (usury) from merchants to solve economic problems. Farmers with much cultivation lands, i.e. large landowners, welcomed the mechanization and machining of agriculture and made a great profit, but small and rural farmers continued to cultivate with a traditional style (Hoagland, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 131-134).

In conclusion, land reforms and lower agricultural products, the production of crops, especially in the field of wheat and essential items, removed the villagers from self-sufficiency and depended on the city, and subsequently forced the country to import essential items, especially wheat and corn. In the years following the land reforms, the government imported wheat and corn from the United States and the Soviet Union (Behnoud, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 146). With the irregularities created after land reforms in the economic system of farmers, new standards of living in the city and the dependence of farmers' villagers on the items they needed to the city and the government created new crises.

6. Analysis of the Land Reform Effects and Land Division in the Islamic Revolution Process

The social and economic consequences of land reform and land division had a great impact on the political developments of the 40s and 50s. As a result of land reforms, in addition to social anomie, economic dissatisfaction, social dissociation in society, with the migration of villagers and farmers to major cities, especially Tehran, led to the

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development of communications and the transfer of social and political protests of people to the community, especially in the villages. Land reforms and land division did not serve the shah's interests and demands and pushed him to the margins of developments, so the Shah acted directly and implemented the U.S. reforms. A few months after Amini's fall, the Shah announced his plan in the form of six bills titled "The White Revolution" or "The Revolution of the Shah and the People." The six principles of the White Revolution were a deeply rooted plan that was founded with the aim of transforming Iran's political, economic, social and cultural structure. The Shah considered the mission of changing Iran's structure in various dimensions as his duty, inflicting heavy blows on the institution of religion.

The Reformation Plan of the White Revolution was the Shah's first major step in the conflict to consolidate his power. Although the Shah apparently declared social welfare as one of his main goals and pretended that the regime had brought culture, health, welfare and security to the Iranian people (Sullivan, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 313).

The Shah became the face of reformists by adding other materials to Amini's land reform plan. He then announced the plan of the White Revolution, which later became known as the Revolution of the Shah and the Nation, on Dey 19, 1341. The plan for the White Revolution and its referendum was communicated to the people on Bahman 6. Scholars and clergy sent representatives to the Shah and informed the Shah of his opposition to the six bills and its referendum, but he did not pay attention to the opposition of scholars and clergy, who considered the survival of his monarchy dependent on its implementation. After the announcement of the White Revolution, Imam Khomeini declared his strong opposition to the referendum in a statement (Khomeini, Sahife Noor, 1989 AD/1361 SH: 23).

In the face of the Shah's actions in the villages, two major groups (agreed and opposed) were created, first, supporting the shah's actions, which included elites aligned with the land reform plan, the headman of a village, and the wealthy rural people. The second group was anti-government and opposed to the division of land, which included pleasant peasants and crumbs. The most dissenting in the majority of the population (farmers and villagers) were petty, pleasant people who showed their disapproval secretly and openly. As a result of land reforms and land division, socio-economic dissatisfaction intensified the political dissatisfaction of the 50s. In 1357, especially since the second half of 1357, the tendency of rural youth and farmers to the revolution and Imam Khomeini's movement played an important role in the victory of the revolution. The expansion of the revolution's

movement was the result of the transfer of urban movements and conditions to the village, and the ideas of the revolution in the cities were transferred to the village, during the fall of 1357, people opposed the Shah to support Imam Khomeini and the rural youth were the mains of this group of people.

As a result of the migration of villagers and farmers to major cities and Tehran and the transfer of revolutionary concepts, the villagers became more interested in political developments, which resulted in the Shah leaving the country on Dey 26, 1357, after which the victory of the revolution was realized. One of the main reasons for the success of active anti-Shah groups in attracting the support of the villagers was the lack of loyalty to the Shah, during the years 1341, the implementation of land reforms until the fall of the Shah in 1357, the intervention of the bureaucrats and government officials caused further discouragement of the villagers from the Shah, causing them to become opposed to the Shah and not obeying the agents of the government (Hoagland, 2002 AD/1381 SH).

Conclusion

Land reforms led to the wandering of farmers and villagers in the Pahlavi II era. The most important social consequences were the migration of farmers from village to city. In the economic context, it caused poverty and their dependence on the state. The small and fragmented lands of rural farmers did not have the proper efficiency to provide them with supplies. Farmers' being non-economic activities in the village and the disintegration between farmers had led to a social turmoil.

The crisis or social anomie caused by land reform, in addition to socio-economic wandering, had other consequences, most notably: consumerism, dependence on urban culture, marginalization, unemployment, rising housing prices. As a result of the economic crisis caused by land reforms, the class gap between new rural immigrants who had just entered the city with groups of lords and former residents of the city had widened. Unfavorable social conditions had forced farmers stranded in the city to be willing to live in any conditions without health and security. In the economic field, issues such as brokerage, getting usury, peddling, cigarette shops, begging became common. As a result of social and economic turmoil, it also led to a bad cultural outcome, including moral corruption, prostitution, economic corruption, usury, and so on, which in sociological theory is called Durkheim anomie. The lack of dependence of rural farmers and society

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on each other, and in other words, the government's distancing from farmers and the government's lack of social and economic support for farmers, had deepened the gap between wonder farmers and the government. It was said briefly in Durkheim's anomie theory. The anomic state in Iranian society was the second Pahlavi era due to the accelerating pace of industrialization of society and the sudden change (land reforms) in the lived society of farmers with traditional culture. With land reform, the world of farmers' living was disrupted and new mental expectations (which the government chanted in the slogan of land reform) did not materialize. As a result, farmers were out of balance and suffered from wandering in the social realm and economy.

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