



The Problem of Evil from the Viewpoint of the Twelver Shī'a Theology

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Abstract

Before Khāja – when theology had not become philosophical in its true sense – theologians attained the solution to the problem of evil from the qur'ānic verses and narrations of Ahl al-Bayt (a). As a result, their solutions were different from the theological theories on evils. The Twelver Shī'a theologians deemed the evil to emanate from God but did not take this as contradictory to the absolute benevolence of God – which was taken from the Christian theology. In the Twelver Shī'a theology, God is Wise, and the existence of evils is not unnecessary and is because of the divine wisdom. Therefore, the evils and afflictions of the material world are good, because God compensates evil with the two principles of “Intiṣāf” and “Iwāḍ.”

Keywords: Evil, Twelver Shī'a theology, Wisdom, Intiṣāf, 'Iwāḍ.

Introduction

One of the important issues that has always engaged the thinkers is the problem of evil. This problem revolves around the question that how the existence of evils such as flood, earthquake, famine, looting, robbery, and oppression can be compromised with the existence of God or at least with some of His qualities such as justice.

In other words, all of us have experienced the existence of afflictions, agonies, and miseries in our lives. Then, the question that comes to mind is that why the human should be afflicted with pain and calamities. Why are some born with a sound and beautiful body, while others who step into this world are ugly and even disabled? Why has God created flood and storm that bring about destruction? Why God has allowed the oppressors to dominate the society? The main foundation of these and suchlike question is the question, “Why do evils and afflictions exist?”

The theologians, who have always tried to remove doubts and explain religious beliefs correctly, have addressed the discussion of agonies and evils within their discussion of the divine acts and their goodness. In theological terms, the question on the existence of evils and afflictions is asked because the divine acts entail worldly or otherworldly benefits. That is, the question is about the possible benefits of afflictions and agonies we experience in this world and deem as evil and harmful, especially some afflictions in which the human has no role, such as the ones that are called by theologians as “the primary afflictions” (e.g. disability or blindness of the newborn baby).

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In other (philosophical) word, since God possesses the perfections at the highest and infinite level, He should have not let the fulfillment of evils! For instance, when evils such as flood and earthquake happen, the All-Knowing God certainly knows the cause of that earthquake and can prevent its occurrence, and He must prevent it as He is the Omnipotent and absolute Benevolent. Then, if the evils happen, the reason might be that He does not know its cause or cannot prevent its occurrence! The other choice would be that He knows its cause and can prevent it, but He does not do so intentionally, which will then show His lack of benevolence! In the West, some have taken the issue to a higher level and have taken evils as a reason or indication for the non-existence of God. Consequently, some philosophers of religion have taken the problem of evil as the refuge of atheism (Peterson, 2000: 176). That is to say, they see the existence of evils to be in conflict with the existence of God, and deem the consideration of the concurrent existence of God and evils to be illogical.

The problem of evil is discussed from other directions, too. For example, one of the reasons suggested by some Zoroastrians for the duality of God – i.e., a good god (Ahūrāmāzdā) and an evil god (Ahrīman) – is the discussion of evil and the incongruence of evils with the absolutely good God. They believe that an absolutely good God cannot be the Creator of evils, and so the creator of evils is not the good God, but rather it is Ahrīman (the god of evils) who has created the evils.

Since the Qur'ān and the narrations of Ahl al-Bayt (a) are the main sources of the Twelver Shī'a theologians, their approach to the problem of evil is different from the approaches of other Islamic theologians such as Ashā'ira, Mu'tazila, and Islamic philosophers.

Unlike philosophers, the Twelver Shī'a theologians do not take evils as non-existential, and contrary to Ashā'ira, they do not believe that agonies exist without any reason, and have disagreements with the Mu'tazila on the quality of the discussion of evils. The article at hand first gives in a short report on the Muslim philosophers' viewpoints to the problem of evil and criticism of those stances, and then examines the problem of evil from the viewpoint of the Qur'ānic verses, Islamic narrations, and the Twelver Shī'a theology.

The definition of good and evil

The Twelver Shī'a theologians deem the existence of agonies and evil as a necessary matter derived from intuitive cognition, and take doubts in their existence as baseless. Aside from the necessity of the essence of the existence of afflictions, the meaning of good and evil is evident. Nonetheless, the theologians have defined good as the perception of the consistent (because they are consistent) and evil as the perception of the contradictory (as they are contradictory). Therefore, this definition has an informing function, as good and evil are among matters that do not need definition (Miqdād, 1985: 120-121).

The statements of the majority of notable Twelver Shī'a theologians gives in this same meaning of good and evil. They have emphasized that good and evil do not need definition in general, and can be divided into sensory and intellectual based on their associated objects. If the associated object and perceiver of good or evil is a sensory matter, it is called "sensory good or evil," and if the associated object is intellectual, it is called "intellectual good or evil" (Ḥillī, 1986: 20-21; Khāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, 1986: 174-175). However, philosophers have serious disagreements on the meaning of good and evil. In the following lines, some of the existing definitions are given.

1. Good means existence (i.e., good is equal to existence) and evil means non-existence (i.e., evil is equal to non-existence). In this meaning, we might use good and existence as well as evil and non-existence interchangeably; whatever has existence is good and whatever is non-existent can be described as evil.

2. Good means desirable and evil means lack of perfection or the essential imperfection of an object. Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā, and some other Muslim philosophers have given in this definition of good and evil. Mullā Ṣadrā considers good as something that is desired and sought by everyone so as to fulfill part of his possible perfection. However, evil is the essential absence and non-existence of an object or the imperfection of one of its perfections (Muḥammadriḍā'ī, 2011: 239).
3. Good and evil are secondary philosophical intelligibles; that is, there is no being that is essentially good or bad. Good and evil are abstract terms that have external instances. In other words, good and evil are coincidences of opposites (Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 1993, vol. 2: 423).

Some believe that all these definitions of evil have a presupposition of evil and so arrange the discussion right from the beginning based on their presupposition and hypothesis, and define evil only after that. Then, it is better to abandon definition and advance the discussion based on the instances of evil, i.e. our simple, common sense perception of evils (Peterson, 2000: 177).

Types of evil

Since Twelver Shī'a theologians deem evident the essence of the existence of evil and its meaning, they have not divided evil in conceptual manner, but rather, they have made the division based on the instances of evil. In his *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*, Khāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī mentions five types of evil instances,

1. Evils and afflictions that the legally responsible person has caused, such as divine limits and discretionary punishments;
2. Afflictions and calamities that cause great benefits for the person, such as the difficulties of learning that lead to becoming a scientist;
3. Afflictions that repel a huge damage, such as taking medication that the human despises but is necessary for curing a disease or damage;
4. Afflictions that occur due to the divine laws: God has inviolable and unchangeable laws in this world that have many benefits, but might be bad for a person in a certain situation. For example, fire has many benefits, but it sometimes leads to a burn or another affliction in certain cases;
5. Preventive and protective evils, such as self-defense against a person who has attacked you, where you hit him before he can hit you: This event is evil for the aggressor (Khāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, 1986: 205; Muḥammadi, 2009: 249-250).

In another classification, evils are divided into two types.

1. The primary evils and affliction, which are evils that are sent by God and the human has no role in them;
2. Evils and afflictions that are the consequence of our actions, i.e., the human has been agent, and that evil is in fact a punishment for his action (Muḥammadi, 2009: 251).

Some have divided the evil that follows the human action into two categories: evils that we bring about (e.g. when a person intentionally burns his hand) and evils that are afflicted onto us by other humans who are the creatures of God themselves (e.g., when an oppressor damages us) (Qarḍān Qarāmaliḳī, 1997: 24).

Philosophers have divided evils conceptually. The most comprehensive conceptual classification is that of Mullā Ṣadrā. In his *Uṣūl Kāfi*, Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn introduces four types of evil, including

1. The absolute non-existent objects or pure non-existences such as poverty and death;
2. Imperfection or partial non-existence such as murder or adultery
3. Perceptive evil, such as the perception of pain and agony

4. The principles of ethical evils or vicious faculties such as appetite and anger (Muḥammadriḍā'ī, 2011: 309).

Philosophers' solutions for the problem of evil

The main solutions of the Muslim philosophers for the problem of evil are the non-existence of evil and its relativity. Both theories rely on on-existence, because the relativity of evils means non-existence of the faculty, and this means that evils are non-existential. This way, this stance takes evils as generally non-existential; however, some evils are absolute non-existence, while others lack the faculty. Therefore, evil is not existential and cannot be the creature of God.

Martyr Muṭahharī says that the non-existence of evil does not mean that what is known as evil does not exist, so that some might say this is against necessity; because we obviously see that blindness, deafness, oppression, tyranny, ignorance, disability, death, earthquake, and other afflictions exist. We can deny neither their existence nor their evilness. Rather, the point is that all these matters are “non-existential” and “absent,” and their existence is of “faulty” and “empty” types, and they are evil because they are non-entity, non-existence, shortage, and emptiness per se (Muṭahharī, n.d., vol. 1: 151).

Some philosophers have taken the non-existence of evils as self-evident, but they have provided reasons for the non-existence of evils, too. One of the reasons is that there is no doubt in the goodness of the essence of existence, and this is an evident point. On the contrary, if the evil is not non-existential, it should be existential, and the requirement for this is that not every existence is good and some of the beings are evil. Therefore, there can be no interrelation between goodness and existence, while philosophers have taken the concomitance of good and existence as self-evident. Another reason that the majority of philosophers have put forward for the non-existence of evils is that God is the absolute good, and nothing but goodness can be emanated from the absolute good; therefore, evil cannot be existential (Muḥammadriḍā'ī, 2011: 316-317; Mullā Ṣadrā, 2000, vol. 6: 133).

With regard to the question that if God could not prevent these non-existential matters (evils) so that these non-existential evils did not exist, philosophers answer that evil in the world of being is like the necessities of the quiddities; that is to say, it is necessary for the creation of quiddity, while it is not created by itself, but rather is made by accident. Therefore, it is made by accident and depends on the quidditive mode of the created being (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2000, vol. 2: 350; id., 1981, vol. 7: 71-72). The terms “made by accident” and “being necessary for the quiddity” mean that if – for example – we juxtapose some circles, there would be necessarily some empty spaces between them that are impossible to be filled. The necessity of the creation of faulty and evil quiddities is like the necessity of empty spaces between circles.

The second solutions given in by philosophers is that evil is necessary for the material world. God has created various worlds, including totally good worlds such as the world of angels, the only evil in which is their existential restrictedness; otherwise, there is no contrariness and conflict in them. Therefore, God is able to create a world that is void of any contrariness, conflict, and – consequently – evil.

Evils always exist in the material world, because this is a necessity for the material world, and the material world does not exist without contrariness, conflict, and – consequently – evil. That is to say, assuming the material world without contrariness and conflict breaches the assumption, because existential restriction as well contrariness and conflict are part of the essence of the material world; therefore, the material world is impossible to be absolutely good.

A question might be raised here is that “Is the creation of a material world that entails evil is good?” The answer is that the existence of evil is an essential requirement of the material

world. However, it is incumbent upon God to create a world whose good is more than its evil, because there is no doubt in the goodness of the material world and the existence of more good than evil in it – even though its evils are quite a few. The reason that the world has more good than evil is that God has created the world through His infinite knowledge, power, and wisdom, and if it is not complete, the reason is that it has not been possible to create it in a more complete mode, because He is not stingy or impotent.

Therefore, the creation of the material world without any evil is rationally impossible. As Mullā Ṣadrā asserts, asking for an evil-free world is like asking the question that why fire has not been created in a manner that it could not bring about any evil; that is, why fire is not non-fire so as not to burn my clothes when it touches them. Therefore, God's potency cannot be considered limited, because the problem here stems from the incapability of the material objects. (Id., 2000, vol. 7: 78).

Other solutions for the problem of evil

Before examining the problem of evil, giving their solution, and explaining their theory, the Twelver Shī'a theologians have referred to other solutions that are not congruent with the principles of Islam and Ahl al-Bayt (a) school of thought. One of these solutions is that of the dualists who consider all agonies to be evil and attribute them to the god of evils. Another solution is that of the Ash'arītes. Since Ash'arītes do not believe in the rational goodness and badness and rather take it to stem from Islamic law, they assert that all afflictions and evils are from God, He has wanted the situation to be so, and whatever He does is good. Some others such as Tanāsukhiyya and Bakriyya introduce deservedness as the philosophy for these afflictions and evils. That is to say, the consequences of our own actions in life cause these afflictions. They even say about issues such as the birth of a blind baby that suchlike conditions are the effect of the afflicted persons' acts in their previous lives. From the viewpoint of Shī'a theology, all these justifications are wrong and baseless (Ṭūsī, 1985, vol. 2: 141-142; Muḥammadī, 2009: 248).

Evil in the Twelver Shī'a theology

Evil in the qur'ānic verses and Islamic narrations

The evils of the world of being have been referred to in some qur'ānic verses and Ahl al-Bayt's (a) narrations. Before examining the solutions for the problem of evil, we present some verses and narrations that discuss evils.

Chapters Daybreak (Qur'ān 113) and Men (Qur'ān 114) evidently point out the existence of evil.

1. Say: I seek refuge with the Lord of the Dawn from the mischief of created things; from the mischief of Darkness as it overspreads; from the mischief of those who practice secret arts; And from the mischief of the envious one as he practices envy (Qur'ān 113:1-5).
2. Say: I seek refuge with the Lord and Cherisher of Mankind, The King (or Ruler) of Mankind, the god (or judge) of Mankind, from the mischief of the Whisperer (of Evil), who withdraws (after his whisper) (Qur'ān 114:1-4).
3. Truly man was created very impatient; fretful when evil touches him; and niggardly when good reaches him (Qur'ān 70:19-21).
4. Man does not weary of asking for good (things), but if ill touches him, he gives up all hope (and) is lost in despair. When we give him a taste of some Mercy from Ourselves,

after some adversity has touched him, he is sure to say, "This is due to my (merit)"... (Qur'ān 41:49-50).

5. When We bestow favors on man, he turns away, and gets himself remote on his side (instead of coming to Us); and when evil seizes him, (he comes) full of prolonged prayer! (Qur'ān 41:51).
6. Every soul shall have a taste of death: and We test you by evil and by good by way of trial. to Us must ye return (Qur'ān 21:35).
7. And We turned (the cities) upside down, and rained down on them brimstones hard as baked clay (Qur'ān 15:74).
8. By the Soul, and the proportion and order given to it; and its enlightenment as to its wrong and its right (Qur'ān 91:7-8).
9. And indeed We will make them taste of the Penalty of this (life) prior to the supreme Penalty, in order that they may (repent and) return (Qur'ān: 32:21).
10. ... But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not (Qur'ān 2:216).

Numerous traditions refer to the existential nature of evil as well as the divine wisdom and its existential reasons. Some examples are as follows.

1. The Prophet of Allāh (s) said, "None of you will be Muslim unless he believes in divine determinations, no matter if they are good or evil, pleasant or unpleasant" (Ṣadūq, 1978: 380).
2. Abī 'Abdillāh said, "There is no contraction and dilation unless there is a divine decree, providence, or trial in it" (Kulaynī, 1986, vol. 1: 152).
3. 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn (a) said: "O my Lord! Glorified are You, the One who knows the weight of darkness and light. Glorified are You, the one who knows the weight of shade and air" (Afḍalī, 2011: 48).
4. Abī 'Abdillāh said, "The people who received the most severe afflictions and difficulties are prophets, then their followers, and then those who are close to them, from the top to bottom" (Kulaynī, 1986, vol. 2: 252).
5. Abī 'Abdillāh said, "There is a position in the paradise that cannot be achieved by any Servant other than those who have gone through physical difficulties and tests" (ibid: 255).
6. Abī 'Abdillāh said, "The Prophet (s) said, 'O 'Alī! God has trusted poverty to the humans, and anyone who keeps it hidden will received the divine reward of one who fasts during the day and prays during the night'" (ibid: 260).
7. The Prophet (s) said, "Poverty is my honor, and I have been honored by it" (Majlisī, 1984, vol. 69: 30).
8. Answering those Companions who considered martyrs to be only those warriors of the path of God who got killed in the battlefield, the Prophet (s) said, "Martyrs are five types: Those who die because of plague, cholera, drowning, remaining under ruins, or being killed when fighting for the sake of God; all of these are martyrs" (Qadrān Qarāmalikī, 1997: 30).
9. It is noted in a narration, "One who is killed when defending his property is martyr" (ibid).
10. It is mentioned in a narration from Imām Riḍā (a), "The ailment of a believer purifies him of sins and mistakes; it is the divine grace bestowed upon the believer and castigation and curse for the disbeliever. The disease exists in the life of the believer to purify him of his sins" (ibid: 31).
11. Imām 'Alī (a) says, "The good that is followed by fire is not good, and the evil that is followed by paradise is not evil" (Majlisī, 1984, vol. 4: 200).

Other traditions have been mentioned in Ḥadīth collections about the divine justice, “intiṣāf,” “Jubrān,” and “iwāḍ” provided by God in the world and –especially – in the hereafter to the believers in return for difficulties, evils, and calamities they experience in this world. Of course, there are traditions that deem agonies, difficulties, and evils as a result of revenge and deservedness. Suchlike evils belong to the “intiṣāf” group and do not have any “iwāḍ.”

Criticism of the philosophers' viewpoints

The solutions offered by the philosophers for evils do not agree with the content of the Qur'ānic verses and Islamic traditions. Some notable figures relied on verses such as “He Who has made everything which He has created most good” (Qur'ān 31:7), “Such is Allah, your Lord, the Creator of all things, there is no god but He” (Qur'ān 40:62), “...but that which is with Allah is better and more lasting” (Qur'ān 42:36) “And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures” (Qur'ān 15:21) to induce the relative and so non-existential nature of evils (e.g. Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1995, vol. 3: 21). However, these verses do not directly refer to the relativity and non-existentiality of the evils; rather, it seems that the verses and narrations can be used to infer the existentiality of the evils.

On the other hand, the philosophers' theories could not answer many questions and doubts about the problem of evils, because the problem of many evils could not be answered by either suggesting the non-existentiality of evil for the afflicted person or saying that the evil is the necessity of the material world and the good in this world is more than evil. It is evident that suchlike words do not soothe the pain and agony of the suffering person. As Martyr Muṭahharī points out, the imperfect part has the right to object. It can say, “Now that it is necessary that one be imperfect and the other be perfect, why should I be the imperfect one? Why aren't the things opposite?” Suchlike questions could not be solved by merely calling the evils as non-existential or stating that evils or even ignorance are necessary for the material world (q.v. Muṭahharī, n.d., vol. 1: 173-174).

Contrary to the philosophers, the Twelver Shī'a theologians stipulate that evil is existential. As one of the greatest Twelver Shī'a theologians, Shaykh Ṭūsī says that there is no doubt in the essence of the existence of evil. It is clear that what brings about agony and pain for the human and does not agree with the human nature has existence. (Ṭūsī, 1985, vol. 2: 141). Sharīf Murtaḍā, another notable Shī'a figure, says, “The existentiality of evil can be likened to our perception of pain when a limb is cut off, while we did not perceive it before then” (Sharīf Murtaḍā, 1990: 211).

The viewpoint of the Twelver Shī'a theologians to the problem of evil

The Twelver Shī'a theologians, who did not have a philosophical viewpoint before Khāja but rather based their theology on Ahl al-Bayt (a) traditions, considered evil as an existence that always entails a higher benefit. They believed that the evils are created due to the divine wisdom and consideration of some benefits, and they are not useless at all.

The Twelver Shī'a theologians' rational reasons for the existence of benefits in the evils were as follows. First, God is the absolute Necessary Being in all dimensions. Second, the agent of the evil and ugly act does it because of two factors, namely need or ignorance; none of these is attributable to God. Therefore, God cannot be the agent of the ugly act. Thus, there is certainly goodness and benefit in what we call evil, but we are unaware of it (Qadrān Malikī, 1997: 34).

Theologians' rational reason for the non-uselessness of the evils can be induced from the divine verses and numerous traditions such as the second tradition above. Moreover, the Twelver Shī'a theologians' solutions that rely on the two principles of "intiṣāf" and "iwaḍ" can be inferred from many narrations – including most of the above-mentioned ones.

This way, theologians accept the existence of evil in the world and try to solve the problem of evils using the principles of "intiṣāf" and "iwaḍ." These theologians divide evils into three groups.

1. Evils whose agent is the human himself: This type does not pose any serious problem, as it is the result of the human free will.
2. Evils that are done by other humans against a person, e.g. an oppressor who damages another human: Theologians solve the problem of this type of evils using the "intiṣāf" principle. They reason that although it is true that a human has done these evils by his free will (as the perpetration of these evils by – say – an able oppressor in line with the deference granted to him by God and the innocence of the oppressed), God will take the right of the oppressed back from the oppressor in either this world or the other world.
3. The agonies and calamities that arise from nature in which the human has no role such as earthquake, storm, some diseases, flood, and mother-born disability: Theologians take suchlike evils to be compensable, and believe that in response to these pains and agonies that afflict the humans, God should provide the human with so much reward in the Resurrection Day that these afflictions get compensated.

The meaning of "intiṣāf" and "iwaḍ" in the words of Twelver Shī'a theologians

The Twelver Shī'a believe that the pain and damage afflicted by God onto His Servant is for two reasons. First, it might be punishment deserved by the Servant; there is no compensation for this type of affliction, as pointed out in the Qur'ān 2:65: "And well ye knew those amongst you who transgressed in the matter of the Sabbath: We said to them: 'Be ye apes, despised and rejected.'"

On the other hand, the evils might be primary. In this case, they are incumbent upon God if two conditions are present. The first condition is that these agonies should entail a kind of benefit for the person himself or others. This of course is a kind of grace, and if it was not so, God's act would be useless, and it is evident that God is free from doing useless acts. The second condition is that God should compensate the affliction that the person suffers more than the affliction itself, in a way that if agony and compensation are offered to the Servant, he chooses the agony and evil. Ash'arītes have opposed the Twelver Shī'a here, and based on their own viewpoint to the good and bad, they deemed permissible for God to punish His Servant without any sin, compensation, or purpose (Muzaffar, 1998: 44-48). Of course, the reason for the opposition of Ash'arītes to the Twelver Shī'a is fundamental, because Ash'arītes do not believe in the rational and essential good and bad; therefore, they do not try to find a solution for the problem of evil, because they believe that whatever God does is good.

This way, the compensation that is incumbent upon God for the natural evils is "A benefit that is given based on deservedness, but is not accompanied by glorification and adoration. Therefore, the compensation has two conditions: One is that it should be deserved – which is called tafaddūl (favor) if it is not based on deservedness – and the other is that it should not be with glorification and adoration – otherwise, it is called reward" (Sha'rānī, 1973: 469).

Khāja says in *Tajrīd*: "Intiṣāf is incumbent upon God, and this is something said by Islam and its law, and is verifiable by reason." However, "Intiṣāf" means it is incumbent upon the sublime God to take the right of the oppressed back from the oppressor, because God has let the oppressor to dominate the oppressed and has granted him the deference of others.

Therefore, “Granting others’ deference to the oppressor’s oppression is not permissible unless the oppressed is compensated at a level congruent with the oppression he has suffered” (ibid). This way, it is incumbent upon God to compensate the suffering of the oppressed in either this or the other world by getting the good acts of the oppressor now or in future. This way, “intiṣāf” means getting the right of the oppressed back from the oppressor (Daghīm, 1998, vol. 1: 236).

Conclusion

The approaches taken by the Muslim philosophers and the Twelver Shī‘a theologians before Khāja to the problem of evil are very different. From the time of Plato up to now (as suggested by ‘Allāma in *Al-Mīzān*), philosophers have taken evils as non-existential. Their main solution for the problem of evil – no matter if they take it as relative or absolute – has been that evils are not created by God and so dualism is false, creatures are pure good (just like God), and evils are non-good and created by accident.

Most of theologians – especially the Twelver Shī‘a theologians of the early eras – took evils as existential. Of course, some verses of the Qur’ān refer to the creation of death, darkness, etc., and many narrations imply the existentiality of the evils. However, since God is absolute Wise and never commits a useless act, he has had a purpose in creating the evils in the world.

In addition to the divine purpose and concern for benefits in creating evils – either human or natural ones – if anyone is damaged by the human evils, it is incumbent upon God to take back the right of the oppressed from the oppressor in this world or in the other world by taking the good acts of the oppressor and reducing the sins of the oppressed. However, if the evil has a natural cause and the human has no role in its occurrence, God compensates it with something he gives the human in return (along with the purpose He has in creating it), in a way that if the human is given the choice to choose the compensation or the evil, he will choose the evil.

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The noble Qur'ān

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